Power Markets of Asian Countries in the International Markets Environment by T. J. Hammons
Selection of our books indexed in the Book Citation Index 
in Web of Science™ Core Collection (BKCI)
Interested in publishing with us? 
Contact book.department@intechopen.com
Numbers displayed above are based on latest data collected. 
For more information visit www.intechopen.com
Open access books available
Countries delivered to Contributors from top 500 universities
International  authors and editors
Our authors are among the
most cited scientists
Downloads
We are IntechOpen,
the world’s leading publisher of
Open Access books
Built by scientists, for scientists
12.2%
122,000 135M
TOP 1%154
4,800
Power Markets of Asian Countries in the International Markets Environment 593
X 
 
Power Markets of Asian Countries in  
the International Markets Environment 
 
This Chapter deals with the current state and problems of power markets in Asian countries 
in the international market environment. The process of restructuring the electric power 
industry and forming power markets in the world has almost a twenty-year history. Certain 
experience has been gained that reflects both the positive effects of market transformations 
in the electric power industry and some problems. Power markets in Asian countries are 
formed on the basis of world experience. However, in different countries this process 
progresses at different paces. Generalization of the experience in market transformations in 
the electric power industries of Asian countries, analysis of the benefits, and risks that may 
occur as a result of such transformations will help specialists solve the problems encoun-
tered in their countries. 
 
16.1 Development Of Power Market In India 
At the time of independence in 1947, the Indian power sector was merely concentrated in 
and around a few towns and urban areas to meet the need. In the following decade, it saw 
development of massive river-valley projects that led to some form of limited intercon-
nected systems to provide power to the population along particular belts as a side-by-side 
benefit to the effort made for irrigation for agricultural need and flood control. However, the 
nineteen sixties gave proper status to development of the power sector both in terms of ge-
nerating unit sizes and transmission voltage due to the requirement of rapid industrial de-
velopment. This called for integration and evolution of the state grids. Attempt to join these 
grids to form the five regional grids became successful by the nineteen seventies and eigh-
ties with unit sizes going from 210 to 500 MW and transmission voltage from 220 to 400 kV 
as a consequence of transfer of a large amount of power from coal pit-head (mine-mouth) 
thermal power stations to urban conglomerations. Subsequent scenario of the power sector 
in the nineteen nineties and beyond has been quite bright from the point of view of devel-
opment of HVDC systems, incorporated both for bulk power supply over a large distance 
up to about 1370 km, be it within a large state or region or for inter-regional transfer of pow-
er, and also for inter-regional back-to-back connection for limited transfer of power. Side by 
side to this, the sector was unbundled with the recognition of generation, transmission and 
distribution as separate and distinct activities so far as the power supply system is con-
cerned. Both at state level and central level regulatory commissions were formed to decide 
tariff, grid code, etc. With opening up, the sector experienced participation of the private 
sector entities, mainly in generation and then to some extent in distribution. Transmission 
still remains a monopoly, with public holding terming it as State Transmission Utility (STU) 
or Central Transmission Utility (CTU) depending upon whether it belongs to any state or 
center. With Central Electricity Regulation Commission (CERC) permitting open access to 
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integrated resource planning approach identifying generation location and possible corridor 
for transmission of power from source to load. Thereafter, studies are performed to confi-
gure in detail the network for evacuation of power from the generating stations and conse-
quent strengthening of the existing network, if required, with the level of voltage chosen 
with a view to have an adequate margin for future expansion. Transmission capacity expan-
sion so planned is then deliberated in the Standing Committees region-wise through a con-
sultative procedure to identify the utilities to build, own and operate the relevant expan-
sions. 
 
Accordingly, with the transmission system still being totally need-based and enjoying natu-
ral monopoly, the pricing is tightly aligned to long-term capacity allocations. Though open 
access is in vogue, in reality it has not been segregated yet as an independent facility under 
the fear of jeopardizing the existing setup. On the other hand, lack of addition may result in 
congestion sometime at some pockets during grid operation, Consequently, its management 
is totally based on the discretion of the concerned Regional Load Dispatching Center 
(RLDC). The long-term transactions have priority over short-term transactions. The RLDCs 
have discretionary powers over interstate dispatch and load regulation. Inter-regional (Pool 
to Pool) unscheduled interchange transactions are then used for easing congestion.  
 
16.1.1.3 Ancillary Services Market 
Ancillary Services are defined as those services that are necessary to maintain reliable opera-
tion of the interconnected / integrated transmission system. These services are required to 
effect a transaction. It includes reactive power and voltage control, loss compensation, sche-
duling, dispatch and settlement, load following, system protection, energy imbalance and 
black start facilities. In India a lot of work needs to be done in this area as described below. 
 
Load Following-Primary Response 
●  Free Governing Mode Operation (FGMO) is mandatory as per grid code. 
●  Issue is diluted / scuttled under the garb of technical jargon / issues put forth by 
generators. 
●  Services are basically not priced and implicitly paid through capacity charges. 
Therefore, there is no incentive for Independent Power Producers (IPP).  
●  Frequency linked dispatch guidelines are for secondary response. 
 
Voltage Control 
●  Reactive drawl and injection at interstate exchange points are priced. 
● It is a simple mechanism. Issues in treatment are virtually of residual amount. 
●  Generators are not paid and very often they take refuge under a conservative ma-
chine capability curve.  
 
Loss Apportionment  
●  Losses are shared by long-term customers in ratio of their subscriptions in ISGS. 
●  All energy transactions are discounted by estimated losses during scheduling.  
●  There is regulatory intent of moving towards the concept of incremental losses. 
 
 
the inter-state transmission facility from November 2003 [1], it opened vistas of power trad-
ing by state-owned companies or private traders or joint sector venture. It was an important 
step after promulgation of the Electricity Act 2003 [2]. Activities that followed and aimed at 
influencing scheduling and real time grid operation with pseudo Power Exchange [3] in 
place definitely pave the way for healthy trading in power. This is unlike other commodities 
in market. Electricity cannot be stored in its form and hence calls for supply-demand match-
ing at every instant of time. Section 16.1 gives the status of such trading prevalent in India 
considering the market related to energy, generation capacity, transmission capacity and 
ancillary services one by one. Also, with the development in neighboring countries, the pos-
sibility of power and energy trading is examined. 
 
16.1.1 Energy Market 
For the Indian power sector, the bilateral energy market is on the basis of long term, short-
term, day-ahead or intra-day commitments. With measurements logged at 15-minute inter-
vals, a weekly cycle of settlement of energy is carried out. This is based on before the fact 
commitments at mutually agreed terms, but taking into account deviations settled at fre-
quency actuated dynamic rate known as the Unscheduled Interchange (UI) rate [3]. Howev-
er, the process has excessive reliance on the UI mechanism, though regulatory caps restrict 
the rate. The trend is encouraging with consensus being built for an organized market in this 
respect in the form of Power Exchange (PEX). 
 
16.1.1.1 Generation Capacity Market 
As one goes back in history, typically under Central Government regional power stations 
[termed as Inter-State Generating Stations (ISGS) (be it thermal – fossil fired or gas-based, hy-
dro or nuclear)] established at different times have a common basis of sharing of power 
amongst the beneficiary states of the concerned region. An allocation is made of 85% of the 
installed capacity of the station by that procedure. Hence the capacity may be thought of as 
locked up in long-term bilateral contract between the producer and consuming states. The 
remaining 15% floating capacity is highly sought after during peak demand and it keeps 
changing hands subject to negotiating skill and political networking of the beneficiary causing 
a considerable amount of heartburning for the losers. What started as a flexibility margin to 
accommodate the seasonal demand pattern has degenerated into a discretionary instrument.  
 
On the other hand, lackluster participation of private players in capacity addition (genera-
tion and transmission) could be attributed to lack of an organized capacity market. Howev-
er, hope exists due to stray examples of capacity trade. One such case is with the Power 
Trading Corporation (PTC) brokering the sale of royalty share of the Himachal Pradesh 
State Electricity Board (HPSEB) in the Nathpa-Jhakri Hydro-Electric Project to Punjab State 
Electricity Board (PSEB) for the summer months. 
 
16.1.1.2 Transmission Capacity Market 
The Central Electricity Authority, an apex technical body of Government of India in the 
power sector, carries out perspective planning as a whole. With the data collected through 
load survey by its regional units in collaboration with the state electric utilities, long term-
load forecasting is done. Based on the same matching, generation is formulated through the 
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and social concerns. Cross border trading in electricity has technical considerations as well as 
political and economic ones. Pricing should be such that both sides benefit. For example, if one 
party has a lot of inexpensive hydropower, during monsoon seasons then it may benefit from 
selling it at lower price to a neighbor rather than having the water spill. There is necessity of a 
larger perspective while planning through an integrated approach for the entire SAARC 
(South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation) region. Both Generation capacity and 
Transmission interconnection capacity are to be enhanced. To be adopted is common principle 
/ methodology for tariff determination, operational protocol, security / reliability and 
regulation. To be evolved also is the Contractual Agreement that addresses principal 
obligations that are equitable, risk sharing, issues related to financial and payment, 
commercial and legal, dispute resolution and arbitration. 
 
Therefore, prerequisites for Regional Power Pool (RPP) may be summarized as – 
● Technical solutions not difficult but Political will of the member countries important 
● A cooperative mindset 
-Willingness to reconnect the subcontinent 
-Efforts to build trust / sensitize 
-Greater sensitivities to issues 
● A commitment from the member countries for 
-Resources / manpower 
-Reciprocal measures 
● Success of Bilateral exchange will create the ground for multi-lateral exchange 
● Regional economic prosperity should take precedence over political compulsion. 
 
Thus, it is in the nascent stage, there is lot of promises in power trading in India with the 
participation of a number of players from public or private or joint holding companies. 
Permission for open access really has created opportunities for improving supply system 
through competition in terms of overall economy as well as ultimate efficiency. With the 
typical characteristic of the commodity (power) in the market that in its normal form cannot 
be stored and at every instant supply-demand matching is called for, inherent risk dictates 
necessity of well-laid principles of practices to be followed for short-term, mid-term and 
long-term contracts.  
 
So far as power and energy trading with neighboring countries is concerned, presently 
power trading is based on bilateral agreements and although Energy Ring is high in SAARC 
agenda, the progress has remained slow. The strategies for promotion of trading can be 
through carrying out sector reforms, setting up suitable institutional arrangements, joint 
investment in project including Environment Impact Assessment (EIA), private sector par-
ticipation, long term transmission planning and free exchange of information. 
 
16.2 Russia's Power Industry Restructuring Current State And Problems 
Russia’s power industry is on the way to radical structural and managerial reformations. 
Reduction in electricity demand in the early 1990s provided good conditions for structural 
and managerial changes in the industry. However, the country is facing new industrial 
growth and the favorable period of excessive generation is coming to an end. The industry 
needs fast and effective reforms for economic efficiency improvements and investment 
Scheduling and Dispatch 
●  RLDC coordinates as well as implements inter-utility contracts. 
●  Decentralized resource scheduling is in vogue with state load serving utilities having 
full operation autonomy of dispatching their generation resources.  
●  Though as per grid code there is a provision for 5% spinning reserve, due to perpe-
tual shortage, in reality implementation has not been possible yet. 
●  Well-defined timeline exists for declaration of availability and requisitioning of ener-
gy up to capacity subscriptions of the shareholders. 
●  Expenses clubbed under the RLDC Operation and Maintenance (O&M) head is paid 
by long-term constituents only. 
●  At present a sum of Indian Rupees (INR) 3,000 / day/ transaction is charged for 
scheduling open access transactions. 
●  Inter utility settlement statement (Regional Energy Accounting taking care of UI and 
Reactive Accounting) is issued by the Central Pool Administrator. Capacity and 
energy charges are settled mutually while the unscheduled and reactive energy set-
tlement is routed through a pool. 
 
System Protection 
Protection Coordination Committee (PCC) decides  
●  Equipment protection coordination at the regional level. 
●  System monitoring and supervision is carried out by RLDC. 
 
Energy Imbalance 
●  It is addressed through unscheduled interchange mechanism. 
●  Weekly settlement cycle based on above is in vogue. 
●  It is the discretion of concerned RLDCs for arbitrage across asynchronous (HVDC) 
links. 
 
Black Start 
●  It is purely voluntary.  
●  It is well documented under Regional Black Start Procedures. 
●  UI mechanism is suspended during period of disturbance and actual transaction is 
treated as schedule. 
 
16.1.2 Possible Power and Energy Trading with Neighboring Countries 
India is surrounded by the countries Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, Srilanka. Pakistan creates 
major prospect in South Asia for trading in power and energy due to disposition of natural 
resources of different kinds for mutual benefits of all. Nepal and Bhutan are rich in Hydro 
resources, Bangladesh is rich in gas reserves and India is rich in coal resources, thus provid-
ing promising option for cooperation among countries. India can emerge as the main poten-
tial power / gas export market for the neighboring countries. Generation can be at source 
and trading through electrical interconnection. India can supply coal to the neighboring 
countries and can import gas from Bangladesh. 
 
Issues to be addressed in the process of development are investment capabilities, lack of 
market information, viability of buyers, inadequacies in institutional mechanism, environment 
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2005-2006 only 170 GW of generating capacity was available for operation. Taking into ac-
count a necessary capacity reserve of 21.4 GW (16.6% of maximum demand) the actual 
excess of capacity in Russia is 19.9 GW or 9.7% of available amount. UES of Russia supplies 
electricity to several countries in Europe and Asia (Figure 16.2). 
 
12.5% of total generation was lost in the transmission and distribution networks. The annual 
electricity consumption grew by 4% in 2000 and 2.5% in 2001-2005.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 16.2. Export and import of electricity in 2005, GWh 
 
16.2.2 First Steps of Restructuring 
The restructuring process was launched in 1992 [4]. The ownership pattern was changed 
and the existing State-owned local utilities were rearranged into joint stock companies. Nuc-
lear power plants with a total installed capacity of 21 GW were left under State control. 
 
The joint stock company RAO “UES of Russia” was established in 1992 as a new managerial 
holding. 34 large power plants with a capacity of 57 GW (approximately 27% of total gene-
rating capacity) were withdrawn from local utilities to reduce the monopoly in power gen-
eration and became the property of RAO “UES of Russia”. Also, the decision was made to 
concentrate the transmission network in RAO “UES of Russia” as well as Central and Re-
gional Dispatching Offices. It was supposed that each new local utility had to delegate no 
less than 49% of its shares to the holding. The RAO was commissioned to set up and operate 
a wholesale market both technologically and commercially. Actually, not all the utilities 
delegated this percentage of their shares to the RAO. Nevertheless, RAO “UES of Russia” 
acquired too much property and authority. 
 
Today RAO “UES of Russia” is the monopoly in the field of energy supply and is the finan-
cial and industrial holding, which consists of a number of regional power utilities, large 
federal power stations and intersystem electric grid. The State owns the controlling stake of 
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attraction. This Section reviews the restructuring policy and describes the current state and 
development of a competitive environment in the Russian power industry. 
 
Russia is an Eurasian country, and only about 30% of the power industry locates in its Asian 
part (in Siberia and Far East). But restructuring ideology is the same for each part of Russia. 
Therefore, the power industry state and restructuring will be considered in Russia as whole. 
 
16.2.1 Technical Characteristics of the Russian Power Industry 
The main distinctions of the industry are long-distant electricity transmission, unevenly allo-
cated energy resources as well as electricity generation and consumption over vast territory.  
 
 
Figure 16.1. Interconnected power systems in UES of Russia 
 
The Unified Electric System (UES) in Russia is still operating as a single complex. There are 
77 local utilities combined into 7 regional interconnected power systems [4-6] (Figure 16.1). 
Six of them (excluding the Far East) operate synchronously. The transmission network cov-
ers six time zones, which helps reduce the peak demand by 6%. 
 
The Russian power industry had 219.2 GW of installed capacity up to the beginning of 2005, 
including 805.2 GW running synchronously within UES. 14.0 GW ran separately from UES 
in the Russian Far East and in the Arctic regions of the country. Taking into account disman-
tling units the industry had a slight growth of generating capacities in 1999 and a slight de-
crease in 2000.  
 
All power plants in Russia generated a total of 953,100.0 GWh of electricity in 2005 including 
340,700.0 GWh within UES. Thermal power plants on organic fuels generated 629,200.0 
GWh or 66% of total production. Hydropower plants generated 174,400 GWh (18.3%) and 
nuclear power plants produced 149,500.0 GWh (15.7%).  
 
The peak of electricity demand in 2005 in UES was registered on January 26 at 6 p.m. and 
reached 128.7 GW. The total excess of generating capacity in UES was 63.5 GW or 33% of 
installed amount. However, not all installed capacity could be used at peak hours. In winter 
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After the first steps of restructuring the situation in the power Industry remained very tense [4]. 
First of all, the UPS badly needed new investments. Financial injections into the industry were 5-
6 times less than was required. This resulted in dangerous aging of generating and transmitting 
facilities. Nearly half the existing infrastructure exceeded its intended service life [7].  
 
The efficiency of electricity and heat production decreased. Auxiliary electricity consump-
tion in power plants together with electricity losses in networks increased to 23% in 1998 in 
comparison with 17% in 1991. The fuel component of electricity cost increased by 11% in the 
1990s. The relative annual profit of the industry fell down from 25.5% in 1993 to 11.3% in 
1999. This led to a hard and unstable financial condition for most of the local power utilities. 
 
A huge debt of customers (more than $4.3 billion) was accumulated in the 1990s. The debt 
was comparable with the annual income of RAO “UES of Russia”. For years, the industry 
subsidized the Russian economy by supplying the electricity and heat to non-paying cus-
tomers. A large portion of payments was accepted in barter and mutual debt write-offs. The 
situation with non-payment was improved considerably in 1998-99 as payments in money 
rose to 90%. But the accumulated debts pulled the industry down and did not allow local 
utilities to develop their generating and network facilities.  
 
Wholesale and retail markets in Russia were highly regulated. However, the system of the 
State regulation was not effective. The pricing mechanism on the wholesale market was ob-
solete and did not encourage cost reduction. The regulation on local retail markets fell hos-
tage to local governments and politicians. Electricity prices were too low (see Table 16.2) and 
did not often compensate even for the production costs. It led to generation reduction and 
consumer cut-offs. The legislation in the industry remained far behind the current needs. 
 
Unreliable fuel supply was an urgent problem for the industry. Coal miners and natural gas 
suppliers did not provide power plants with enough fuel because the power plants and util-
ities often failed to pay for the fuel in time. This resulted in dangerous situations on some 
territories of Siberia and the Far East of Russia, particularly in the severe winter of 2001 
when electricity and heat supply was interruptible. Unreliable fuel provision led to ineffec-
tive generating unit commitment.  
 
Most experts considered the situation in the Russian power industry dangerous. In any case, 
the industry needed radical and wide-scale reforms based on the interests of different par-
ties in the society.  
 
16.2.3 A New Stage of Restructuring 
A new stage of restructuring started in 2001 after Governmental resolution validation. The 
main goal of the stage is to provide stable work of the industry on the basis of competitive 
market development. The following measures are needed to succeed.  
 
Development of a new legislative framework for the industry. The Parliament and the Pres-
ident enacted a new State Law “About Power Industry” in March 2003. The Law declared the 
market relationships in the industry as a main instrument for efficient and stable electricity 
supply.  
the RAO. The Government appoints both the Board of Directors and the Chief Executive of 
the RAO. It regulates all activities of the energy holding and regulates the prices of its ser-
vices and production. 
 
Two kinds of electricity markets were established in the 1990s - the nationwide wholesale 
market and the local retail ones. Electricity prices for power producers on the wholesale and 
retail markets were fully regulated and set on the “cost plus” principle.  
 
Large power plants, which were withdrawn from the utilities, nuclear power plants and 
local utilities with generation surplus could sell their electricity to utilities with deficient 
generation on the wholesale market. A few large industrial customers got the right to partic-
ipate on the wholesale market. Each local utility had a choice either to generate power local-
ly or to buy it on the wholesale market. The retail markets were established primarily within 
the territories under service of the local utilities and had to supply their end customers. The 
responsibility for the wholesale market operation was delegated to RAO “UES of Russia”. 
The responsibility for retail market operation was imposed on the local utilities that pro-
vided distribution and customer services.  
 
Wholesale electricity prices in Russia were based on generation and transmission costs. The 
Federal Energy Commission regulated the costs and profits of producers on the wholesale 
market under control of the Federal Government. The costs of utilities and prices on the 
retail markets were subject to regulation by Local Energy Commissions under control of 
local Governments. Electricity prices for the wholesale and retail customers were set as 
blanket (weighted average) prices calculated as a ratio of electricity cost to volume of elec-
tricity to be purchased. The prices on both the wholesale and retail markets were adjusted 
on a quarterly basis.  
 
RAO “UES of Russia” was an operator on the wholesale market. It bought, as a single trade 
agent, electricity from producers using the pay-as-cost principle and sold electricity to the 
utilities at a blanket (average) price. The electricity price, additionally to the generation ex-
penses, included transportation, operation and investment components. The same approach 
was used on local retail markets. The prices on the wholesale market were differentiated 
with respect to price zones according to the transportation and congestion costs. The prices 
on the retail markets were differentiated with respect to consumer groups, such as large 
industrial, small industrial, agricultural, residential and others. 
 
Up to the middle of 2003 prices increased by 1.5-1.7 times [5]. Average prices greatly differ 
in the Siberian and Far-Eastern regions. There are cross subsidies between different groups 
of consumers. In most regions (except Urals and Siberia) industrial consumers pay above the 
average price, while rural residential consumers (except Siberia) pay less. 
 
The funds for generation and transmission expansion were mostly filled up through the 
regulated investment component of wholesale prices. The funds for development of power 
plants and distribution networks that belong to local utilities were filled up through the 
regulated component of retail prices. 
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Administrator of the Trading System (ATS) was established as a non-profit entity for the 
wholesale market design and operation. ATS registers amounts of bilateral electricity trade, 
sets prices on the spot market for different buses of consumption, and supervises trading 
agreements and payments for electricity on the wholesale market. 
 
Seven Wholesale Generating companies (GenCos) are designed and will be created with 
private property. The Wholesale GenCos have approximately equal installed capacities of 
8.5-9 GW. Six of them will combine thermal power plants. One GenCo will consist of hydro 
power stations. Additionally, there is an independent GenCo consisting of 8 nuclear power 
plants. This company is supervised by the Ministry of Nuclear Energy and belongs to the 
State. Unbundled generating companies are established under dispersed ownership. Private 
investors are expected to bring financial resources to update running units and construct 
new ones. 
 
Reforming the electricity markets. Significant developments are expected on the wholesale 
market. Two challenges will be available for electricity producers and customers. They may 
participate on the spot market or arrange bilateral forward contracts for electricity delivery. 
New companies such as the wholesale and local GenCos, local electricity suppliers, Federal 
Transmission Company and large end customers will participate on the wholesale market 
instead of vertically integrated utilities. System Operator will be responsible for safety and 
reliable operating conditions in UES. 
 
A new pricing mechanism will be introduced in the wholesale market. Instead of blanket 
average prices a new market will introduce local marginal prices. The wholesale customers 
will pay at the margin what it costs to produce and supply electricity to them. On the one 
hand, it will encourage the power producers to improve the efficiency of production. On the 
other hand, it will result in price growth.  
 
The spot market organization needs the development of sophisticated measurement system. 
Considering vast territory of the country this is a complicated technical problem. 
 
Improvements in the State regulation. The State regulation of the industry should be concen-
trated on price regulation in the spheres of natural monopolies. On the wholesale market the 
focus of regulation is to prevent anticompetitive abuses and the market power exercises. On 
the retail markets regulation should be focused on balancing the interests of suppliers and 
customers. The prices in the natural monopoly spheres remain regulated including trans-
mission tariffs, expenses of System Operator and ATS. 
 
Prices in the competitive spheres are not regulated, but the Federal Energy Commission as 
the State Regulator can set price caps on the wholesale market. Also the State Regulator en-
dorses the rules for customer’s access to the networks and the procedures for tariff calcula-
tion. Local Energy Commissions regulate the tariffs for heat supply and electricity distribu-
tion as well. 
 
Any cross subsidies between territories, groups of customers, different kinds of products 
(electricity and heat energy) and services should be eliminated step-by-step. 
Two existing Laws, namely “State tariff regulation in the industry” and “State monopolies in 
Russian Federation”, were changed. Additionally the Government issued several new Resolu-
tions on pricing of electric and heat energy, the wholesale market rules and boundaries of 
pricing zones. 
 
The new Laws and Governmental Resolutions form a power policy that provides broad 
guidelines for coming reforms and enact the legislation necessary for implementing this 
policy. It helps to provide a transparent regulatory framework and to establish a market 
encouraging efficiency improvement. 
 
Restructuring local power utilities. Local power utilities are under restructuring now. They 
separate “non-profile” businesses and create new entities for power generation, distribution 
and supply. They introduce new systems for bookkeeping and financial planning.  
 
Small and combined electricity and heat production plants formed local generating companies 
(GenCos). Later, the local GenCos were combined into 14 territorial GenCos to improve their 
maintenance and to make cheaper financial credits for development and reconstruction. Local 
distribution companies (DistCos) are to provide an open access to the electric networks for end 
customers. Later, the local DistCos were combined into 5 inter-regional DistCos. 
 
Several supply (energy-sales) companies are under creation in each region.  
 
They will compete for the end consumers by lowering the price of its services and by offer-
ing more profitable and convenient conditions of energy supply. One of the supply compa-
nies is Guaranteeing Supplier (GS). GS is a company, which continues the obligation to pro-
vide supply service to all customers on the GS’s service territory who request such a service.  
 
Competition can be introduced in the generation and supply spheres, but is not feasible for 
transmission, distribution, and system control businesses because these are the functions of 
natural monopolies. 
 
Restructuring the holding RAO “UES of Russia”. It is evident that RAO “UES of Russia” domi-
nates the industry and must be promptly and substantially restructured to improve efficien-
cy and attract necessary investment. The following steps were made in 2002. Some of them 
are expected in the nearest future. 
 
The Federal Transmission Company (FTC) was created to operate, maintain and expand the 
national transmission network. Lines and substations with voltage 220 kV and higher are 
combined under control of the new company. FTC will remain the sister company of JSC 
“UES of Russia” for two or three years. Later, 75% of FTC’s shares will belong to the State. 
 
New company called “System Operator” (SO) was established to operate UES. SO is targeted 
to provide reliable electricity supply and non-discriminatory access to the networks. SO 
combined the Central Dispatching Board in Moscow and seven regional Dispatching Cen-
ters. Later the dispatching divisions of the local power utilities will join SO. The ownership 
of the State in the capital of SO is more than 75% from mid-2005. 
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16.2.5 A Transition Period in the Restructuring Process 
A transition period has started since March 2003 after the new Federal laws were enacted. 
There are two sectors on the wholesale market during the transition period.  
 
The first one is a competitive spot market with bids/offers submission on a per hour basis 
and with local marginal price setting. The other one is a fully regulated sector with “cost 
plus” principle of pricing for producers and average prices for customers within tariff zones.  
 
Until 2006 the regulated sector worked with the single purchase agency. After January 2006 
the sector was organized in the form of long-term bilateral contracts. The State Regulator 
will consider the prices of producers and define the set of suppliers for each wholesale cus-
tomer. Prices within the bilateral contracts will be set for three or five years. Every customer 
will be able to dissolve the whole package of bilateral contracts once a year and join the 
competitive spot market.  
 
Firstly each producer could sell up to 15% of its generation in the competitive sector. Year by 
year the share of sales in the competitive sector grows. In the end of transition period all elec-
tricity trade will be competitive. The Government defines duration of the transition period. 
 
16.2.6 Regional Problems of the Market Development 
The wholesale market of electricity in Russia has been established as the nationwide market. 
Nevertheless, the unity of the market exists only «dejure» [9]. The wholesale market is di-
vided in fact into several large regions due to the high cost of electricity transmission and 
limitations in the transmission capabilities. 
 
The European part of Russia including Ural, Siberia and the Russian Far East are three large 
regions. The structure of the economy, electricity consumption and climatic conditions in 
these regions are quite different. These circumstances bring additional troubles for using a 
nationwide model of the wholesale market. The Federal wholesale market in Russia should 
have distinctions at least in three large regions. 
 
The European region of Russia has 72% of total installed capacity and 74% of total electricity 
consumption. Fossil fuel power plants in the region burn mainly natural gas. There are nuc-
lear and peak (semi-peak) hydro power plants among producers. Generation is relatively 
equally spread over the territory. Transmission network is well developed and provides 
alternative ways for power supply. The European section of UES has the surplus generation 
and transmission reserves. 
 
It seems reasonable to have the following model of the wholesale market: 
 
a) the independent Administrator of the Trading System (ATS) in the region organizes and 
operates the day-ahead wholesale spot market. ATS works as a «flexible» entity arranging 
transactions as a brokerage system in the power exchange. The bilateral trade for a year and 
a quarter is permitted in addition to the centralized spot market; 
b) large fossil-fired power plants and hydropower plants are combined into private generat-
ing companies. Nuclear power plants are combined into the State concern ”Rosenergoatom”, 
16.2.4 Investment Attraction into Russia's Power Industry 
The volumes of new equipment commissioned in the last decade have been extremely small. 
The average annual input of generating capacities in the years 1991-2005 was 0.6-1.5 GW per 
year, while in 1976-1985 construction of new capacities was 6-7 GW. In China this rate was 
17,000 MW annually during the last 15 years [8]. Financial injections into the industry were 
5-6 times less than was required. This resulted in dangerous aging of generating and trans-
mitting facilities [7,8].  
 
Therefore attraction of investments into Russia’s electric power industry is a key problem. 
The solution to this problem will somewhat differ for privately owned generating compa-
nies and for network companies that are regulated natural monopolies. 
 
Attraction of external investors is important for generation expansion and calls for: 
 
● Essential increase in the investment attractiveness of GenCos by providing financial 
transparency, economic stability, predictability of management actions and other cor-
porate measures; 
● Considerable increase in the reliability of State guarantees to the investor by clear leg-
islature, predictability and stability of State policies in electric power industry, etc. 
● Effective system of investment risk insurance. 
 
The above measures can considerably decrease financial risks for investors, which will not 
require high electricity tariffs to compensate for these risks. 
 
At the same time the world experience shows that in a free market environment the short-
term purposes of power companies prevail over the long-term ones which, with time, may 
lead to an inadmissible drop in the reserves of generating capacities, formation of generation 
shortage and as a result growth of electricity tariffs [7,8].  
 
The new Law on the electric power industry envisages prompt and long-term measures not 
to allow such situations. The prompt measures imply introduction of price caps and then 
regulation on the markets in the event that there are no conditions for competition due to 
the shortage of generating capacities. A basic long-term measure is development of a State 
Program for generation expansion that would provide permanent availability of surplus 
capacities on the wholesale markets. This can be based, for example, on nuclear power in-
dustry that belongs entirely to the State. Distributed generation can also play and an impor-
tant role here. The Program should form economic incentives for GenCos and external in-
vestors to invest the capital in construction of new power plants.  
 
As to the regulated network companies, their development can mainly be provided by the 
investment component included in the tariffs for power transmission service. At the same 
time, due to insufficient transfer capability of the electric network, and the need of its essen-
tial increase to expand the conditions for electricity market operation, it may turn out to be 
necessary to attract additional investments both governmental and private. The volumes, 
conditions and mechanisms of attracting such additional investments require additional 
thorough scrutiny. 
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16.2.7 Expected Effects of the Market Reform 
New markets may result in: 
1. Introduction of non-discriminatory relationships among market participants. It follows 
from unbundling the generation, transmission and supply businesses and from the new 
legislation enacting; 
2. Removal of the cross subsidies among businesses, territories and customers. It will pro-
vide proper economic signals for electric power systems operation and development; 
3. Encouragement of the electricity producers to reduce their production cost due to mar-
ginal pricing introduction; 
4. Improvement in financial conditions for generation, transmission and distribution com-
panies due to electricity price growth; 
5. Attraction of domestic and external investments. 
 
At the same time there can be some negative impacts including: 
a. Increase in the wholesale and retail electricity prices due to introduction of marginal prin-
ciple of price setting instead of average regulated approach; 
b. Decrease in electricity supply reliability for the nearest future due to lack of experience in 
operation and control of new unbundled companies. 
 
Thus, the following can be concluded: 
1. The Russian power industry does need an improvement in efficiency of operation and 
new investment inflows. The industry and the Government see the main way out from cur-
rent problems in restructuring of the holding “UES of Russia” and local power utilities. The 
market rules and market infrastructure should be improved for competition introduction.  
2. The new State Law opens good perspectives for further progress in the restructuring 
process. The industry has entered a practical stage of restructuring. Power utilities are un-
bundling for separation of generation, transmission, and supply services. New market rules 
have been developed to improve the wholesale and retail markets.  
3. Two challenges will be available for electricity producers and customers. They may partic-
ipate in the spot market and arrange bilateral forward contracts for electricity delivery. 
There will be competitive and regulated sectors in the wholesale spot market during the 
transition period. Up to 15% of generated electricity is selling in the competitive sector now. 
Year by year the share of the competitive sector will increase. 
4. The restructuring of the industry is accompanied by apprehension of significant increase 
in electricity prices and possible decrease in supply reliability. The restructuring process 
should be well prepared and staged over time. Any new reforming decisions have to be 
made after detail analysis of consequences and based on available potentialities. Different 
regions of the country may choose their own restructuring models and determine the terms 
and rates of restructuring.  
5. Attraction of investments into Russia’s power industry is a key problem. The new legislation 
in the power industry envisages prompt and long-term measures to develop generating facili-
ties and electric networks. The long-term measure stipulates creation of the State Program of 
expansion planning that would provide permanent availability of surplus capacities in the 
wholesale markets. The Program should form economic incentives for GenCos and investors 
to invest the capital in power plants. Development of the market infrastructure can mainly be 
provided by the investment component in the tariffs for power transmission service. 
 
which plays as an independent producer on the wholesale market. Customers on the market 
are local supply companies and large power consumers; 
c) ATS calculates the local marginal prices for electricity based on free bids/offers on the 
spot market. Contract partners define prices within the bilateral contract. The State Regula-
tor sets tariffs for electricity transmission and the System Operator’s services for a year. It 
sets the price caps for the spot market as well. 
 
The Siberian region has 22% of the Russian generating capacity and 21% of total consump-
tion. More than 50% of electricity is produced by large hydropower plants. These plants 
generate very cheap energy and have a strong influence on the economy and ecology of 
different territories. Almost 30% of total amount of electricity is generated in cities at coge-
neration plants. Electricity generation at these plants greatly depends on heat consumption. 
Almost all fossil-fired power plants burn Siberian coals.  
 
The transmission network has weak ties with the European sections of UES and is isolated 
from the Far-Eastern one. Power grid in the region is spread on a vast territory and has limi-
tations on power flows in some cut sets. That is why it is difficult to provide an open access 
to the transmission network for all market participants. 
 
Electricity generation and consumption in Siberia are subject to unstable natural impacts 
due to variations in river inflows and long droughty periods. The climate is severe with an-
nual and seasonal temperature variations. 
 
Considering specific conditions of the Siberian region the following market organization can 
be proposed as rational: 
 
a) establishment of the Siberian branch of ATS with the same main principles of work as the 
ATS in the European part. Proportions between bilateral trade and spot market sales may 
differ from other sections of UES. Regional Dispatching Center, which is the sister-company 
of System Operator, supervises reliable operation of the power grid in Siberia; 
b) electricity transactions should be provided among the market participants located in Siberia;  
c) introduction of a technique for long-term generation scheduling and pricing for hydro-
power plants. The technique will take into account the availability of water in the reservoirs, 
ecological impacts and interests of water users; 
d) introduction of a procedure for price setting on the spot market based on competitive 
prices of electricity and regulated prices of generating capacities. The procedure should re-
duce the “jump up” of the wholesale prices due transition from the average to the marginal 
principle of pricing; 
 
The Far Eastern region has less than 10% of electricity generation and consumption. There 
are a few relatively large power plants combined with a weak and extended network. 
Electricity supply of many territories is separated from UES. There are no sufficient 
conditions yet for the effective competition among producers and suppliers. It seems 
reasonable to save the State regulation for electricity producers for the nearest future. 
Considering the importance of the Far East for the interests of Russia the power industry in 
this region needs special governmental support. 
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Figure 16.3. China regional grids 
 
The installed capacities of the five-generation companies are given in Table 16.1. Each of the 
five-generation groups has a certain amount of share of any local market [11]. After the re-
structuring of generation assets, the State Grid and South China Grid own 24.5GW genera-
tion capacity, of which, 15.9GW capacity is used for frequency regulation and load follow-
ing to ensure the reliable system operation [10].  
 
The installed capacities owned directly by the two grid companies and all regional grid 
companies in 2004 are given in Table 16.2. The total generations of all grids in February 2005 
are given in Table 16.3 [12].  
 
Companies Capacity (GW) 
China Huaneng Group 40.98 
China Datang Co. 4.95 
China Huadian Co. 8.64 
China Guodian Co. 29.30 
China Power Investment Co. 27.96 
Table 16.1. Installed capacities of the five generation companies in 2002 
 
 
 
 
 
Russia has unique conditions for the competitive environment development. Its restructur-
ing policy may be useful for large countries where the power industry is on the way of re-
forms. 
 
16.3 Power Industry Restructuring In China  
Restructuring and reform of the traditional integrated power industry has been started all 
over the world for more than 10 years. In various deregulated power systems, the market 
structures, the degree of privatization and the sequence of reform stages are different. China 
started the process of power industry restructuring since the late 1990s. In this section, the 
current situation of China power industry reform is introduced and the following issues will 
be focused on: market structure, electricity price policy, investment and planning, renewa-
ble energy in the new market. 
 
16.3.1 China Power Industry Structure and its Restructuring  
China has been experiencing significant economic growth since the 1980s. Electricity con-
sumption increased more than three times due to the booming market and manufacture 
industry. At the end of 2004, the installed capacity in China has reached 440GW, and the 
annual generation has reached 2180TWh. Both installed capacity and generation are ranked 
the second highest in the world. Within the 440GW, the proportions of thermal units, hydro 
station, nuclear and wind power are 73.7%, 24.5%, 1.6% and 0.17 %, respectively [10].  
 
16.3.1.1 Power Industry Restructuring 
In February 2002, the State Department issued the Power Industry Structure Reformation 
Program. The program includes three main points: 1) Restructure state-owned generation 
assets, and establish several independent generation companies; 2) Restructure transmission 
assets, and establish two grid companies; 3) Establish State Electricity Regulatory Commis-
sion (SERC) to monitor and regulate the electricity markets. 
 
On the 29th of December 2002, two grid companies, State Grid Company and South China 
Grid Company were established. The State Grid Company has five subsidiary regional grid 
companies. They are North China Regional Grid, North East China Regional Grid, Central 
China Regional Grid, East China Regional Grid and North West China Regional Grid. The 
geographical areas of the regional grids are shown in Figure 16.3.  
 
On the same day, five independent generation companies were established. They are: 
● China Huaneng Group, 
● China Datang Corporation, 
● China Huadian Corporation, 
● China Guodian Corporation, and  
● China Power Investment Corporation.  
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are: open customer-side markets, establish financial markets, such as, futures, forward 
and option markets.  
 
16.3.2 Electricity Price Policy 
The electricity price policy plays an important role in China power industry reformation. 
In May 2005, the National Development and Reformation Commission (NDRC) issued 
three regulations about electricity prices, Generation Price Regulation, Transmission and 
Distribution Price Regulation, and Customer Electricity Price Regulation [14]. 
 
16.3.2.1 Generation Price 
Generation price is composed by capacity price and energy price. Energy price represents 
the variable costs of a power plant. The price is obtained by competition through regional 
auction markets. It is the price for a certain amount of power during a time period. Gene-
rators can submit 3-segment offers or 5-segment offers depending on the market regula-
tions. In some regional markets, the regional grid company provides a reference energy 
price for each provincial generation company.  
 
Capacity price represents the fixed costs of a power plant. It can be calculated as following: 
 
Capacity price = capacity payment / installed capacity. 
 
Capacity price is determined by the installed capacity of the plant and the capacity pay-
ment, which is decided by the NDRC from time to time according to the power supply 
and demand of the time. The purpose of utilizing capacity price is to guarantee the basic 
benefits for power plants. The ratio of capacity price and energy price can reflect the de-
gree of competition in a market. The higher percentage the energy price in a generation 
price, the higher competitive level the market is. In one of the regional markets, the capac-
ity price vs. energy price can roughly be 1: [2~3]. 
 
Electricity price reformation in one of the core parts of power system deregulation. Price 
reformation will be accomplished gradually in a longer term in China. The current two-
part generation price is a transition pricing mechanism towards completely competitive 
electricity market.  
 
16.3.2.2 Transmission and Distribution Price 
In the Transmission and Distribution Price Regulation issued by NDRC, the T&D price is 
composed by transmission price, ancillary service price, and special service price. Trans-
mission price covers the network expansion and maintenance costs. Ancillary service fee 
is paid for the regional grid companies for their provision of ancillary services, such as, 
reserve, frequency control, voltage control, black start, etc. Grid companies use grid-
owned units to provide such ancillary services. The special service prices are charged to 
market participants that require special services from the grid company. Such as, connect 
to the network; build a transmission line for a special project, etc. The government and 
NDRC decide the transmission and distribution prices.  
 
Power Grids Thermal  Capacity (GW) 
Hydro  
Capacity (GW) 
Total Installed  
Capacity (GW) 
State 
Grid  
Own by State Grid 9.8 2.1 7.7 
North China Grid 77 74.5 2.5 
North East Grid 41.5 35.9 5.6 
East China Grid 78 64.4 11.6 
Central China Grid 65.4 41.9 23.5 
North West Grid 27.1 18.8 8.3 
 South China Grid -- -- 80.3 
Table 16.2. Installed capacity in each grid company at the end of 2004 
 
Power Grids Generation (TWh) Increase Rate (%) 
North China Regional Grid 32.6 5.67 
North East Regional Grid 15.4 2.21 
East China Regional Grid 30.3 1.62 
Central China Regional Grid 22.9 6.45 
North West Regional Grid 10.2 13.7 
South China Grid  17.5 1.16 
Table 16.3. Generations of all grid companies in February of 2005 
 
16.3.1.2 Regional Electricity Markets 
The structure of China electricity market is a regional electricity market based on regional 
grids. The first regional market, North East electricity market, started generation auctions 
in January 2004. Four months later, East China regional market started its market opera-
tion [13]. The market participants of a regional electricity market are power system opera-
tion and exchange center, Grid Company, the five-generation companies and local pro-
vincial generation companies. The regional regulator commissions monitor and regulate 
the operation of regional markets. At the current stage, the system operation and ex-
change center is the single buyer of the market. The market settlement mode is Pay-as-bid. 
The Single buyer model has been used in many countries as a transition stage toward 
competitive market.  
 
In the energy markets, generators provide long-term offers and short-term offers in the 
auction market. Long-term offers include annual transaction offers and monthly transac-
tion offers. A Short-term day-ahead spot market will be established in the next stage of 
the regional markets.  
 
Some hydro plants owned by the grid companies provide ancillary services, such as re-
serve, frequency regulation and voltage support. Some compensation mechanisms have 
been applied for the ancillary services provided by the units owned by the generation 
companies.  
 
The mid-term goals of China regional electricity markets are: establish ancillary service 
markets; run day-ahead spot markets; consider unit emission criteria in the auction mar-
kets; start bilateral contract markets and generation right markets. The long-term goals 
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The renewable energy generations currently used in China are mainly solar energy and 
wind energy. The solar energy generation production reached 230MW in 2005. Some of 
the solar energy generations are installed at remote areas. In Shenzhen, a photovoltaic 
power station of 860kW has been interconnected to the transmission grid. It is estimated 
that the total solar generation production could reach 500MW in 2010.  
 
The total installed capacity of wind power in 2005 is 500MW. Besides this, the wind tur-
bine capacity is going up at an annual increase rate of 40%. The capacity is expected to 
reach 100GW in 2020, which will be around 10% of the total installed capacity of that year. 
Wind power and solar energy generations are the potential new generation sources in the 
future China power industry.  
 
One of the factors that limit development of renewable energy is the high production cost. 
The cost of renewable energy is much higher than that of the regular coal-fired genera-
tion. In China, the cost of small hydro generation is around 1.2 times of the cost of thermal 
generation; the cost of biomass generation is about 1.5 times, the cost of wind power is 
about 1.7 times, and the cost of photovoltaic generation is about 11-18 times [17]. The av-
erage generation price for traditional thermal sources is around ¥0.5/kWh, the cost of 
wind power is usually around ¥0.8/kWh and the cost of solar energy could me more than 
¥5/kWh. Besides the high cost of renewable energy, the uncertainty of the renewable 
energy pricing mechanisms and the unclear renewable energy policy also raised the in-
vestment risk. Investors are hesitated to invest in renewable energy generation unless 
they can see the benefits. 
 
The Renewable Energy Act and its regulations provide detailed rules about interconnect-
ing renewable energy units to the grids and the detailed generation prices for various 
types of renewable energy.  
 
In the new regulations, two parts compose renewable energy generation price: govern-
ment regulating price plus market auction price. The wind power generation price de-
cided by the government is expected to be the fossil-fuel generation price plus ¥0.25 per 
kWh. The generation prices for photovoltaic might be classified into two categories: 
¥3.2/kWh for those located at open areas and ¥3.4/kWh for those located in buildings. 
The prices for other renewable energies, such as biomass energy, are also stated in the 
regulations [10]. The government-authorized renewable energy generation prices will 
insure the companies recover their generation costs and the return rate of investment. 
 
To facilitate renewable energy generations, the government authorized some regulations 
as well as the regulating prices. In the Act, it has been explicitly stated that the future re-
newable energy policy will be a quota system. The grid companies must sign purchase 
contracts with renewable generation companies and buy all the contracted renewable 
energy generations in their grids as well as providing transmission services. On the cus-
tomer side, the large customers are compulsory to pay for the shares of the renewable 
energy allocated to them. The future regulations might fix a required proportion of the 
renewable energy in a grid. On the other hand, some preferential policies will be issued to 
encourage generation companies developing renewable energy sources. For example, 
16.3.2.3 Customer Price 
Electricity price for customer is regulated and decided by NDRC. Customer prices can be 
classified into three categories: residential customer price, industry customer price and 
agriculture customer price.  
 
16.3.2.4 Electricity Price Interlink with Coal Price 
Most areas of China have experienced a high increase of electricity consumption in 2003, 
and one third of the provinces are suffering power shortages [11]. In some areas, electrici-
ty demands are higher than power supplies. System operators sometimes have to shed 
load to balance the power demands. On the other hand, the fossil-fuel price goes up sig-
nificantly at the time. Around 74% of installed capacities in China are fossil-fuel thermal 
plants. The high coal price limits the profits of power plants by a maximum extent.  
 
In April 2005, NDRC announced a scheme to interlink electricity prices with coal prices. 
According to NDRC, customer side electricity prices can be adjusted with the change of 
coal prices. A few months later, the customer electricity prices in all provinces increased 
from 0.95 to 3.99 cents (Chinese Cent) per kWh. The average electricity price of the whole 
country has increased 2.52 cents per kWh [15]. This price increase is around 5%. 
 
On the other hand, generation prices all over the country are adjusted with the increased 
coal price. The generation prices of all provincial power companies increased from 0.33 to 
3.1 cents per kWh. Other Independent Power Producers (IPPs) followed provincial power 
companies and increased their generation prices to keep up with the coal price increase [16]. 
 
At the current stage of power system restructuring, government and NDRC are in a lead-
ing position regulating electricity prices. The government and NDRC determine both 
transmission and distribution price and customer side electricity price. Only generation 
prices can be partly decided by auction market.  
 
16.3.3 Renewable Energy Policy 
In China power system, coal-fired thermal power plants dominate the electric power 
generations (around 74%). The generation costs and the electricity prices rely on coal 
prices to a certain extent. With the coal prices continuously going up in 2004 and 2005, the 
profits of most generation companies drop down. On the other hand, hydro generations 
are around 24% of the total generations. Renewable energy generation sources are not 
more than 1% of the total generations. The current renewable energy sources are mostly 
small-scale wind turbines. The slow development of renewable energy was due to the lack 
of market regulations and pricing mechanisms for high-cost renewable energy entering 
electricity markets. 
 
In February 2005, the Renewable Energy Act was issued by NDRC. The Act indicates that 
the Chinese government encouraged renewable energy generation. The detailed regula-
tions of the Act were enforced in January 2006. A proper renewable energy policy and a 
reasonable pricing mechanism would facilitate the development of renewable energy 
sources in China power system.  
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The renewable energy generations currently used in China are mainly solar energy and 
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tion. In China, the cost of small hydro generation is around 1.2 times of the cost of thermal 
generation; the cost of biomass generation is about 1.5 times, the cost of wind power is 
about 1.7 times, and the cost of photovoltaic generation is about 11-18 times [17]. The av-
erage generation price for traditional thermal sources is around ¥0.5/kWh, the cost of 
wind power is usually around ¥0.8/kWh and the cost of solar energy could me more than 
¥5/kWh. Besides the high cost of renewable energy, the uncertainty of the renewable 
energy pricing mechanisms and the unclear renewable energy policy also raised the in-
vestment risk. Investors are hesitated to invest in renewable energy generation unless 
they can see the benefits. 
 
The Renewable Energy Act and its regulations provide detailed rules about interconnect-
ing renewable energy units to the grids and the detailed generation prices for various 
types of renewable energy.  
 
In the new regulations, two parts compose renewable energy generation price: govern-
ment regulating price plus market auction price. The wind power generation price de-
cided by the government is expected to be the fossil-fuel generation price plus ¥0.25 per 
kWh. The generation prices for photovoltaic might be classified into two categories: 
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renewable energy in a grid. On the other hand, some preferential policies will be issued to 
encourage generation companies developing renewable energy sources. For example, 
16.3.2.3 Customer Price 
Electricity price for customer is regulated and decided by NDRC. Customer prices can be 
classified into three categories: residential customer price, industry customer price and 
agriculture customer price.  
 
16.3.2.4 Electricity Price Interlink with Coal Price 
Most areas of China have experienced a high increase of electricity consumption in 2003, 
and one third of the provinces are suffering power shortages [11]. In some areas, electrici-
ty demands are higher than power supplies. System operators sometimes have to shed 
load to balance the power demands. On the other hand, the fossil-fuel price goes up sig-
nificantly at the time. Around 74% of installed capacities in China are fossil-fuel thermal 
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In February 2005, the Renewable Energy Act was issued by NDRC. The Act indicates that 
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tions of the Act were enforced in January 2006. A proper renewable energy policy and a 
reasonable pricing mechanism would facilitate the development of renewable energy 
sources in China power system.  
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rate of return was as high as 15% - 20%. In some provinces, the local governments sign 
long-term contracts with investors.  
 
The contracts guarantee that the generators can get fixed generation prices for a number 
of years. More than 30 overseas companies invested in power plants in China. In 1997, 
their total capacity reached 14.5% of the total installed capacity of the country. In 1999, the 
government started to abolish the fixed high rate of return. Some of the investors do not 
see the high profits any more and withdrawed their investment from the market. The 
overseas generation investment reduced from 14.5% of 1997 to 7.5% of 2002. 
 
16.3.4.3 Power System Planning 
In the traditional integrated power system, planning is performed centrally. For some 
years, power system planning has been under a situation that generation planning always 
leads transmission planning.  
 
After restructuring of the power industry, the integrated power system has been sepa-
rated into some generation companies, and some grid companies. Who will perform pow-
er system planning is still not clear. The State Grid Company has the most possibility of 
being authorized by the government to perform transmission network planning for the 
whole country grid. Each regional grid company is responsible for its’ own regional grid 
expansion and planning. Generation companies are responsible for generation expan-
sions. Where and what size to invest new generations are decided by the government and 
the State Grid Company. Generation companies bid for building new generation capaci-
ties. The government and NDRC examine and approve all the expansion projects.  
 
16.3.5 Challenges 
There are some issues that need to be emphasized in development of the China power 
industry after system restructuring [19]:  
● The structure of generation sources is not yet fully optimized. The proportion of fos-
sil-fired generation sources is much higher compare to other clean renewable ener-
gy generation sources.  
● The high proportion of generation relying on coal makes the electricity prices af-
fected by coal prices significant. 
● The transmission network expansion and planning are lagging the generation ex-
pansion. How to perform generation planning and transmission planning after un-
bundling generation and transmission is an emerging issue. 
 
The challenges to the industry and government in the restructured power system come 
from several sides. From the investment side, efficient policies would facilitate the in-
vestment in renewable energy sources and in optimizing generation source structure. 
From the planning side, generation planning and transmission planning coordination is a 
big challenge for the unbundled system. An authorized body for power system planning 
might be a good option to solve the problem. From the development side, the current sin-
gle-buyer regional electricity market is still in a transient stage towards the competitive 
electricity market. Electricity market models in all countries and areas are various. Find-
some perquisites might be provided for renewable energy, some funds are founded espe-
cially for renewable energy, providing tax reduction or low interest loan, etc. 
 
In Shanghai, the government has started to enforce the regulations on special generation 
prices and purchase prices for Green Power. The residential customers are required to buy 
Green Power at least 120 kWh per year.  
 
16.3.4 Investment and Planning 
The electricity consumption in China has been increasing in recent years. The total con-
sumption in 2004 is 2.17PWh, which is a 15% increase of 2003. In 2005, consumption in-
creased by another 10% and reached 2.4PWh. On the generation supply side, 50GW new 
generation capacity was installed in 2004, and 70GW new generation capacity was in-
stalled in 2005. However, it is still not easy for all investors to enter the market of genera-
tion investment. The five independent generation companies and local government 
owned generation companies play the dominant roles in generation investment, although 
the individual investors and overseas investors hope that they can hold a share in the in-
vestment market. 
 
16.3.4.1 Investment 
After the power industry restructuring, government regulates transmission and distribu-
tion. The generation side is deregulated, and independent power companies are able to 
participate in generation side markets. Each generation investment project is examined 
and discussed by the government before it is approved. 
 
Currently, state-owned generation assets are around 90%, and private investors and over-
seas investors own the other 10%. Of the 90% state-owned assents, 35% is owned by the 
five-generation companies (including the 40GW approved in 2004), and the other 65% is 
owned by the local government generation companies [18].  
 
The generation investors in China are mainly in five categories: 
● The former state-owned five generation companies.  
● Some other state-owned companies. 
● Local government owned generation companies. They own around 55GW capacities 
in total.  
● Overseas investors. They own 37GW in total. 
● Other private investors. 
 
In the new generation investment projects, the state-owned generation companies still 
occupy a large share. For example, the five-generation companies mostly invest in the 
40GW generation capacities approved in 2004.  
 
16.3.4.2 Overseas Investment 
At the end of the 1980s, electrical consumption demands increased dramatically. To at-
tract oversea capital investments to the China generation market, the China government 
has provided a very high rate of return for overseas generation investments. The annual 
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might be a good option to solve the problem. From the development side, the current sin-
gle-buyer regional electricity market is still in a transient stage towards the competitive 
electricity market. Electricity market models in all countries and areas are various. Find-
some perquisites might be provided for renewable energy, some funds are founded espe-
cially for renewable energy, providing tax reduction or low interest loan, etc. 
 
In Shanghai, the government has started to enforce the regulations on special generation 
prices and purchase prices for Green Power. The residential customers are required to buy 
Green Power at least 120 kWh per year.  
 
16.3.4 Investment and Planning 
The electricity consumption in China has been increasing in recent years. The total con-
sumption in 2004 is 2.17PWh, which is a 15% increase of 2003. In 2005, consumption in-
creased by another 10% and reached 2.4PWh. On the generation supply side, 50GW new 
generation capacity was installed in 2004, and 70GW new generation capacity was in-
stalled in 2005. However, it is still not easy for all investors to enter the market of genera-
tion investment. The five independent generation companies and local government 
owned generation companies play the dominant roles in generation investment, although 
the individual investors and overseas investors hope that they can hold a share in the in-
vestment market. 
 
16.3.4.1 Investment 
After the power industry restructuring, government regulates transmission and distribu-
tion. The generation side is deregulated, and independent power companies are able to 
participate in generation side markets. Each generation investment project is examined 
and discussed by the government before it is approved. 
 
Currently, state-owned generation assets are around 90%, and private investors and over-
seas investors own the other 10%. Of the 90% state-owned assents, 35% is owned by the 
five-generation companies (including the 40GW approved in 2004), and the other 65% is 
owned by the local government generation companies [18].  
 
The generation investors in China are mainly in five categories: 
● The former state-owned five generation companies.  
● Some other state-owned companies. 
● Local government owned generation companies. They own around 55GW capacities 
in total.  
● Overseas investors. They own 37GW in total. 
● Other private investors. 
 
In the new generation investment projects, the state-owned generation companies still 
occupy a large share. For example, the five-generation companies mostly invest in the 
40GW generation capacities approved in 2004.  
 
16.3.4.2 Overseas Investment 
At the end of the 1980s, electrical consumption demands increased dramatically. To at-
tract oversea capital investments to the China generation market, the China government 
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16.4.1 Progress in the Restructuring of the Japanese Electric Power Industry 
The restructuring plan for the Japanese electric power industry has made slow but steady 
progress through three broadly divided steps. The major milestones in these steps are as 
follows (Figure 16.5): 
 
                   
1st Step: 1995 
- Liberalization of access to wholesale electricity industry (entry by IPPs) 
- Introduction of a wholesale power supply bidding system 
- Institutionalization of a retail electricity business at specified points of supply (Special 
electricity industry). 
 
2nd Step: 2000  
- Liberalization of retail electricity sales to extra high voltage customers (customers receiv-
ing electricity at 20 kV and with contract power of 2,000 kW or more). Newcomers with 
power generating facilities are referred to as Power Producers and Suppliers (PPSs). 
 
3rd Step: 2005 
- Liberalization of retail electricity sales to high voltage customers (customers with con-
tract power of 50 kW or more) 
- Establishment of a neutral body, the Electric Power System Council of Japan (ESCJ) 
- Establishment of the Japan Electric Power Exchange (JEPX) 
- Elimination of pancake rates 
- Revision of the balancing rule (the imbalance system). 
2001
2002
2003
2005
2004
2006
2007
1998
1997
1996
1995
2000
1999
 - Introduction of competition into wholesale
electricity industry(IPP)
 - Special electricity industry (supply electricity to
meet demand at the specified point of supply)
 - Introduction of retail competition on large size
customers (extra high voltage: over 20kV,
2000kW)
 (large industry, department store, office building)
 - Introduction of retail competition on medium
size customers (high voltage: 500kW to
2000kW)
 (medium size  industry, super market, medium size
office building)
 - Introduction of retail competition all high voltage
customers (high voltage: 50kW to 500kW)
 (small size  industry, super market, medium/small
size office building)
-Foundation of ESCJ and JEPX
 - Start discussion on fully retail competition
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63%
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Figure 16.5. Steps of the restructuring 
ing the best electricity market model for the China power system will be one of the goals 
for the future China power industry. 
 
16.4 Restructuring of the Electric Power Industry and  
the Current State of the Power Market in Japan  
The restructuring plan for the Japanese electric utility industry has first focused on the major 
objective of lowering electricity rates, which are rather expensive by international standards, 
to levels comparable to those prevailing in foreign countries. However, the plan has called 
for achieving this objective through competition while also addressing public-interest issues 
such as environmental protection, with due consideration of the conditions specific to Japan, 
such as the nation’s current heavy dependence on imported resources (Figure 16.4). 
Institutional reforms have therefore been pushed forward in accordance with the Basic Law 
on Energy Policy Making. A Japanese-style electricity deregulation model designed to 
secure fair competition while retaining the integrated power generation/trans-
mission/distribution regime has been created with the existing electric power companies 
playing a central role in working to promote the public interest. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
Figure 16.4. Basic principle of the restructuring 
 
The Japanese electric power industry is being restructured in stages as discussed later. In 
the stage begun in April 2005, just over 60 percent of the retail electricity market was 
opened up, while basic mechanisms for the Japanese-style deregulation model, such as a 
neutral body and an electric power exchange, were put in place. Although it is still too 
early to judge the results of the restructuring, some appreciable benefits such as lower 
electricity rates have already been achieved. In fiscal 2007, discussion commenced on pro-
gressing toward complete retail deregulation. In order to provide inputs for this discus-
sion, the efforts made so far to restructure the electric power industry were assessed. 
 
This Section reviews the progress of restructuring and discusses the characteristics of the 
adopted Japanese-style electricity deregulation model. It then assesses and verifies the 
ongoing power industry-restructuring plan and reports on the results of the industry re-
structuring efforts [20,21]. 
 
Improvement of efficiency
Public interest
 Achievement of universal service
 Reliability of supply
 Energy security
 Environmental protection
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for the future China power industry. 
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for achieving this objective through competition while also addressing public-interest issues 
such as environmental protection, with due consideration of the conditions specific to Japan, 
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3) Support for the operation of interconnected transmission lines (management of ATC, 
maintenance work coordination, and congestion management) 
4) Provision of information about transmission systems. 
 
As shown in Figure 16.7, the ESCJ is composed of a governing board and various expert 
committees, such as a rule-making committee and a rule monitoring committee under the 
control of a general meeting of members who are the general power utilities, PPSs, whole-
sale electricity suppliers and neutral parties, each having an equal voting right. A consulta-
tive board conveys the views of non-members to the Council. 
 
 
Figure 16.7. Structure of the ESCJ 
 
16.4.2.2 The Japan Electric Power Exchange 
The Japan Electric Power Exchange (JEPX) is a privately managed voluntary institution that 
was founded as Japan’s first nationwide power exchange. The JEPX performs risk manage-
ment functions, including the formation of a benchmark price, and the provision of selling 
and procurement means in the event of a mismatch of supply and demand. 
 
Anyone who is capable of handling the generation and has assets worth 10 million yen or 
more can participate in the trading market. The JEPX deals in the following types of market. 
 
1) Day-ahead market (spot deals): 
Spot deals are deals for selling and buying electricity in units of 30 minutes to be used the 
next day and for 48 different commodities of electricity. Contracts are closed on the single-
price auction basis. 
In Japan, in order to fully consider the characteristics of electricity and perform public welfare 
tasks, an electricity deregulation model designed to achieve structural reforms within the 
framework of electric power companies’ integrated power generation and transmission system 
has been adopted. This is instead of the vertically unbundled electric utility model prevailing 
in the United States and European countries. The changes made in the third step are described 
in more detail as these represent the salient features of Japan’s structural reforms. 
 
16.4.2 Outline of the Institutional Revisions Effective in 2005 
Figure 16.6 outlines the institutional revisions made since April 2005. The main measures 
implemented include: 
 
          
Figure 16.6. Institutional revisions made since April 2005. 
 
1) Establishment of a neutral organization and the enforcement of activity regulations in 
order to secure fairness and transparency in the network sector within the integrated power 
generation/transmission framework 
2) Creation of the Japan Electric Power Exchange 
3) Expansion of retail electricity deregulation to cover all high voltage customers 
4) Elimination of the pancake rate system in order to facilitate the use of power grids across 
the country. 
 
16.4.2.1 Neutral Agency 
The neutral agency is called the Electric Power System Council of Japan (ESCJ), and its main 
functions are:  
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3) Support for the operation of interconnected transmission lines (management of ATC, 
maintenance work coordination, and congestion management) 
4) Provision of information about transmission systems. 
 
As shown in Figure 16.7, the ESCJ is composed of a governing board and various expert 
committees, such as a rule-making committee and a rule monitoring committee under the 
control of a general meeting of members who are the general power utilities, PPSs, whole-
sale electricity suppliers and neutral parties, each having an equal voting right. A consulta-
tive board conveys the views of non-members to the Council. 
 
 
Figure 16.7. Structure of the ESCJ 
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Objectives Issues Areas of Assessment Items of Assessment 
Enhanced 
efficien-cy 
of electric 
power 
supply 
service 
Retail elec-
tricity 
market 
- Changes in electrici-
ty rates 
- Factors contributing 
to cost reductions and 
rate cuts 
- Initiatives other than 
electricity rates 
1) Electricity rates 
- Changes in the levels of electricity 
rates 
- Quantitative analyses of the effects 
of institutional reforms on electrici-
ty rates 
2) Factors other than electricity rates 
- Efforts in terms of services 
- Initiatives designed to strengthen 
business bases, including technolo-
gical innovation and development 
of overseas business operations 
3) Options for customers 
- Number of suppliers and shares 
- Customer satisfaction 
 
Wholesale 
electricity 
market 
- Robustness of the 
power generation and 
wholesale electricity 
markets 
- Performance of 
JEPX’s initial purpos-
es 
1) Wholesale electricity market 
- Trading volume by electric power 
companies and PPSs, and prices 
- Trade channels (cross trading with 
JEPX, self-supply and purchase 
from other companies, etc.) 
- Correlation among wholesale elec-
tricity prices, generation costs and 
retail prices 
2) JEPX 
- Position of JEPX in the wholesale 
market  
- Trading volume and prices in spot 
market and forward market, and 
liquidity compared with bilateral 
trading 
 
Supply 
Reliability 
Construc-
tion, main-
tenance 
and re-
newal of 
facilities 
- Facility investment 
- Maintenance and 
renewal of facilities 
- Attainment of suita-
ble generating mix 
- Supply reliability 
- Changes in the amount of facility 
investment 
- Facility maintenance levels and 
measures for extension of life of 
facilities 
- A future power generation mix, 
transmission line construction 
plans, and electric power develop-
ment plans by PPSs, etc. 
Intercon-
nected 
transmis-
sion line 
- Limitation of line 
capacity 
- Construction of interconnected 
lines 
- Maintenance and operation of in-
terconnected lines 
Table 16.4. Assessment of the Macroscopic Policy Objectives (continued on next page) 
 
2) Forward market: 
Forward market deals sell and buy electricity for one year ahead from the following month 
in one-month units. Contracts for 24-hour delivery and for daytime delivery from 8 a.m. to 
10 p.m. on weekdays are traded. Transactions are performed on a continuous session (price-
oriented, time-oriented) basis. 
 
16.4.3 Assessment of Institutional Reforms 
A study on deregulating retail electricity for all customers started in fiscal 2007. The institu-
tional reforms implemented so far are now being assessed and verified. The assessment 
looks at: 
1) How macroeconomic policy objectives, such as enhanced efficiency, stable supply and 
environmental protection, have been achieved; and 
2) What kind of results have the implications of individual institutional reforms, such as the 
elimination of pancake rates and the establishment of a neutral agency and an electric power 
exchange brought?  
 
The results of the assessment were made available by the summer of 2006. This section 
summarizes the areas of assessment and the items assessed. 
 
Regarding the macroeconomic policy objectives in 1) above, as shown in Table 16.4, the ef-
fects of the current institutional reforms on enhancement of the efficiency of electric power 
supply services, supply stability, and environmental protection is verified. Essential points 
in the assessment include the robustness of the electricity rate and trading market, capital 
spending, congestion of interconnected transmission lines, investment in the development 
of technologies, and investment without consideration of the environment.  
 
On the other hand, the effects of individual institutional reforms are assessed in terms of the 
objectives mentioned in Table 16.5.  
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 Areas of Assessment Items of Assessment 
Wheeling 
service sys-
tem 
- Elimination of pancake 
rates and revitalization of 
wide-area power transaction 
- Functions of the new im-
balance charging system 
- Effects on wide-area transactions and 
on JEPX trade  
- Recovery of transmission line costs, an 
appropriate cost reimbursement mechan-
ism, and restrictions on the siting of 
power sources in remote places 
- The incidence of imbalances and the 
shouldering of charges 
 
Activity regu-
lations 
- Securing of fairness and 
transparency in the trans-
mission/distribution seg-
ment through activity regu-
lations 
(a) Information firewall 
- Management of information related to 
wheeling service, and formulation and 
announcement of internal rules 
(b) Prohibition of discriminatory treat-
ment 
- A survey of cases of discriminatory 
treatment in access to wheeling service 
for specific power suppliers 
(c) Prohibition of cross-subsidization 
(keeping of different account books) 
- Preparation and disclosure of docu-
ments needed to verify an income and 
expenditure account statement and the 
process of preparing the statement 
 
Neutral 
agency 
-Securing of fairness and 
transparency in access to 
power grids, construction of 
facilities and disclosure of 
information 
- Establishment of an organization and a 
mechanism designed to achieve fairness, 
transparency and neutrality 
- Rule-making procedures securing fair-
ness, transparency and neutrality 
- Consistency of load dispatching com-
munication and system information dis-
closure systems (OASIS) with the neutral 
agency’s rules 
- Fairness and transparency in the 
scheme for rule monitoring 
- Current situation of rule monitoring 
- Implementation of load dispatching 
communications 
- Appropriateness and security of the 
information disclosure systems (OASIS) 
Table 16.5. Assessment of Individual Institutional Reforms 
 
16.4.4.1 Electricity Rates 
The wide gap between electricity rates in Japan and in foreign countries, which triggered the 
structural reforms in the Japanese electric power industry, has narrowed compared with 
before restructuring of this industry was started, as shown in Figure 16.8. 
 
Objectives Issues Areas of Assessment Items of Assessment 
 
Supply 
Reliability Load dispatching control and sys-
tem management 
- Burden on load dis-
patchers 
- Appropriateness of 
ancillary services 
- Changes in electric power 
companies’ load dispatching 
control and system man-
agement activities following 
institutional reforms 
- Harmony between protec-
tion systems such as special 
protection schemes and 
short-circuit relays and new-
comers’ facilities 
- Provision and operation of 
ancillary services 
Safety and disas-
ter restoration 
- Changes in the func-
tions of safety and 
disaster prevention 
systems 
- Response to safety and dis-
aster restoration needs 
Technology de-
velopment and 
succession of 
skills  
- Necessity of devel-
opment of new tech-
nologies in the power 
transmission and 
distribution sector, 
etc. 
 
- Implementation of technol-
ogy development projects in 
response to institutional re-
forms 
Environ-
mental 
protection 
Choice of power 
sources 
- Orientation toward 
a generation mix at-
taching importance to 
economic efficiency 
only 
- Changes in the generation 
mix and CO2 emissions in 
the power sector 
 
Development of 
environment-
related technolo-
gies 
- Efforts toward envi-
ronmental develop-
ment that have no 
direct contribution to 
profits 
- Investment in the devel-
opment of environment-
related technologies 
Interconnected 
transmission line 
- Limitation of line 
capacity 
- Construction of intercon-
nected lines 
- Maintenance and operation 
of interconnected lines 
Table 16.4. Assessment of the Macroscopic Policy Objectives (continuation) 
 
16.4.4 Evaluation of Institutional Reforms in the Early Stage 
Institutional reforms are now being systematically evaluated from the above mentioned 
perspectives. This section evaluates the institutional reforms in their early stage based on 
currently available data. Note that some factors, such as electricity rates, can be accurately 
evaluated as the result of institutional reforms as sufficient time has passed since the early 
stage of the reforms, while it may be too early to evaluate other factors such as the robust-
ness of transactions on the electric power exchange that were commenced in the third step 
of the reforms. 
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ly 17%. As the graph shows, residential charges, which are not liberalized, have declined to 
sufficiently lower levels. In the liberalized segment, a simple comparison between electricity 
rates in 2000 and in 2004 revealed a significant drop of nearly 26% in electricity rates for 
commercial customers. 
 
16.4.4.2 Situation of Newcomers 
A look at newcomers (PPSs) in the liberalized sector shows that although their share is still 
small at around 2%, PPSs have been steadily increasing their power sales (Figure 16.10). 
PPSs’ shares vary according to electric power companies. In Tokyo Electric Power Compa-
ny’s service area, where the utility meets an immense demand for power, newcomers hold a 
share of more than 5%, whereas PPSs account for no more than 1% in the service areas of 
some local electric power companies. 
 
 
Figure 16.10. Share of power producers and suppliers (PPSs) 
 
16.4.4.3 The Japan Electric Power Exchange 
The Japan Electric Power Exchange is still immature as it was opened only in April 2005. As 
shown in Figure 16.11, over the five months following its opening, the exchange has had thin 
trading and prices are relatively high in summer, but subsequently transactions have increased 
gradually and prices have become steady. Reasons for this tendency include the emergence of 
relatively large sellers, a rise in oil prices, and the suspension of large power sources. 
 
At the time of the exchange’s opening, an outlook for trading volume was provided as 
shown in Figure 16.12. The actual volume of transactions already surpassed the estimate for 
the first year in mid November.  
 
Challenges that the exchange must tackle in the years ahead include: 
Measures to increase the trading volume: Increase in the number of exchange members, 
such as in-house power generation facility owners. 
 
Figure 16.8. Comparison of electricity charge before and after the institutional reform 
 
 
Figure 16.9. Changes in electricity rates over the past decade 
 
Changes in electricity rates over the past decade are shown in Figure 16.9: electricity rates 
dropped by 1.8% annually on average from fiscal 1994 to fiscal 2004 and a simple compari-
son between electricity rates in fiscal 1994 and in fiscal 2004 shows a decline of approximate-
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Figure 16.13. ATC of the interconnected line (from 2005 to 2014) 
 
The frequency and duration of transmission line congestion are shown in Table 16.6. 
Congestion occurs several times a month. In September and October 2005, transmission 
congestion occurred due to a decrease in the counter power flow (a power flow in the 
opposite direction) resulting from the extended period of repairs on large power sources. 
The ESCJ has undertaken a technical study on ways of managing interconnected transmis-
sion lines, including reinforcements. 
 
Month Frequency Duration Planned Emergency Planned Emergency 
April 0 1 0 10.82 h 
May 1 0 130 h 0 
June 4 2 90 h 26.5 h 
July 3 3 123.5 h 56.97 h 
August 1 1 80 h 744 h 
September 20 2 660 h 257 h 
October 31 0 824 h 0 
November 3 1 123.5h 39.6h 
Table 16.6. Congestion of Interconnected Lines (2005) 
 
Introduction of new commodities meeting needs: Introduction of short-term forward deli-
very contracts. 
 
  
 
                                                      yy/mm/dd 
Figure 16.11. Price and traded energy in day-ahead market of JEPX 
 
16.4.4.4 ATC and Transmission Line Congestion 
Available transmission capacity (ATC) for the next ten years in Japan is shown in Figure 
16.13 [22]. In Japan, due to the geographical conditions and historical background, intercon-
nections between electric power companies are loosely connected and transmission conges-
tion poses a problem in domestic interconnected lines. ATC is therefore presented for each 
interconnected line.  
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Figure 16.13. ATC of the interconnected line (from 2005 to 2014) 
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Thus, this Section has outlined the institutional reforms in the Japanese electric power in-
dustry and an assessment of the reforms already made. The structural reform of the Japa-
nese electric power industry is characterized by a step-by-step approach as well as by re-
forms being implemented within the framework of electric power companies’ vertically in-
tegrated power generation and transmission structure. Although it is still premature to 
draw conclusions about the results of the structural reforms, electricity rates have dropped 
and the differential between electricity rates at home and abroad has narrowed considera-
bly. A national-level assessment of the institutional reforms was made and the results were 
produced in the summer of 2006. Based on these results, discussion has commenced in order 
to establish a Japanese-style electricity liberalization system. 
 
16.5 Pricing for Transmission Services in Korean Electricity Market 
In Korea, the trend of heavier real power flows into densely populated load centers from 
several vast power plants in remote locations will continue or become profound, leading to 
their national-interest in transmission bottlenecks during some periods of the year. The first 
step toward increasing the role of market forces in managing transmission system opera-
tions is to develop the role of location price signals to direct the actions of market partici-
pants toward outcomes that improve operations when congestion occurs on the bulk power 
grid. In this overall perspective, we need to thoroughly investigate how best it would be to 
send an adequately accurate location price signal with the congestion costs incorporated 
into the transmission pricing rule when the electricity market is not unduly maintained. This 
Section attempts to make a supportive and self-explanatory proposal that it could fit the 
Korean Cost-Based Pool (CBP) that satisfactorily sharpens the location price signal. 
 
16.5.1 General Characteristics 
 
16.5.1.1 The Evolution of Competition in Korean Electricity Industry 
It used to be assumed that electricity generation, transmission, distribution and supply en-
joyed significant vertical economies that would be lost if the functions were placed under 
the control of different companies. Such long-held belief made it possible that the Korea 
Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO) had monopoly power – supported by legal protection.  
Since the 1997 financial crisis, economic policy in Korea has aimed to remove barriers to 
trade and competition. Network industries like electricity and natural gas, which were his-
torically sheltered from competition and operated within national or regional boundaries, 
have experienced radical change as a consequence. National pressure to liberalize electricity 
markets reflected the perceived benefits of introducing market forces into the electricity in-
dustry previously viewed as a natural monopoly with substantial vertical economies. In the 
meantime, the generation sector was split into six subsidiaries that will be privatized. Still, 
the KEPCO is being engaged in monopolistic business activities of the transmission and 
distribution systems alike. In an attempt to help mitigate potential negative prospects about 
which the hasty reform drive could bring, a new transitional electricity market, dubbed 
‘Cost-Based Pool (CBP)’, was set up in 2001. 
 
 
 
16.4.4.5 Adequacy of Generation Capacity 
One of the ESCJ’s functions is to assess reliability of the power system. An assessment of the 
adequacy of generation capacity is given in Table 16.7. The adequacy of power sources is 
expected to be maintained at an appropriate level for the next ten years or so. 
 
 Demand/Supply Balance 
2009 (August) 2014 (August) 
Peak demand  18,200 19,246 
Planned capacity 19,838 21,268 
Reserve ratio 1.09 1.11 
Table 16.7.  Prospect of Generation Adequacy 
 
16.4.4.6 Capital Investment by Electric Power Companies 
Capital investment by electric power companies has fallen sharply over the past several 
years as shown in Figure 16.14. This decline has occurred partly because demand growth 
has slowed down as shown in the Figure and partly because electric power companies have 
virtually completed their bulk power transmission systems through investments made over 
the years. In fact, reductions in capital spending have released financial resources that have 
allowed the electric utilities to lower electricity rates. 
 
 
Figure 16.14. Trend of capital investment in utilities 
 
The population of Japan began to decline in 2005, much earlier than expected, and so electric 
power demand cannot be expected to increase significantly in future. Still, the facilities that 
were constructed during the growth period will have to be renewed by around 2010. How 
the facilities should be managed within the context of electricity deregulation is an 
important question that remains to be answered.  
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Figure 16.15. The basic structure of Korean transmission pricing 
 
 Access charge: All the market participants who would likely use the transmission system 
should pay the charge for the connection assets that directly interconnect them with the 
substation. As is well known, a ‘deep’ basis is better rather than a ‘shallow’ basis in case of 
the access charge. From a practical standpoint, the CBP comes to have a clear preference for 
a “shallow” basis since it is a relatively good tool for elaborating the stringent criteria. 
 
 Transmission usage charge: The electricity passing the connection assets is transmitted from 
generators to loads through the core of transmission system. Two components, i.e. the loca-
tion and the common service components, are included hereof. In principle, the common 
component is made up of facilities related to the reactive power, non-operational land hold-
ings, communication equipment, whereas the location component encompasses transmis-
sion lines and circuit breakers, etc. In the CBP of Korea, postage-stamp rate method is tradi-
tionally used for the common component, while the power tracing method associated with 
the location component is poised to give a location price signal to the participants. In Figure 
16.16, the transmission charges in the CBP are represented for better understanding. 
 
16.5.2.2 Power Tracing Method 
The gist of the tracing method is to evaluate the contribution of transmission users to trans-
mission usage of location components. This method may be employed to determine which 
generators are supplying corresponding loads, how much use each load is making of specif-
ic transmission lines and what are the annual costs of individual network elements to be 
recovered. 
 
Especially, the cost of substation with which several branches are connected is actually di-
vided into each line. In this method, more detailed load flow analysis of the system and its 
operation at the peak time are usually required to allocate the estimated annual costs of 
network elements to all the participants who use them. In an early stage, the fault current 
based power tracing method in the Victoria pool was scrutinized, but at this time, the me-
thodology set forth by Felix Wu is in popular use [26]. 
16.5.1.2 The Distinctive Feature of CBP 
The characteristics of the Korean CBP market can be briefly summarized as follows: 
 The Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO) is the single purchaser. Exceptionally, 
large consumers (above 50MVA) and district electricity businesses can either buy elec-
tricity directly from the Pool or KEPCO. 
 The generators added at peak load are given the short-term marginal price (SMP) and 
the capacity payment, 7.17 won/kW as the fixed cost, while the base-load power plants 
receive both the base-load marginal price (BLMP) and the capacity payment, 21.49 
won/kW as the fixed cost. When the CBP was first designed, greater portions of the 
windfall profits from the high SMP for each generation company were envisaged be-
cause of the shortage of base generation capacity. Thus, the so-called BLMP was 
adopted to evade the excessive revenues of the base-load generators. 
 As such, there is no location price signal. If the generators inevitably change their output 
due to the congestion, they have been paid the uplift to make up for their generation cost. 
 The generation cost is a priori known by the committee’s actual test. Individual genera-
tion companies offer their available capacities alone, not prices. Then the Korea Power 
Exchange (KPX) performs economic dispatch based on the generation fuel costs.  
 Indeed, the transmission price seems to be nominal in that it is published every year but 
not really applied to the market participants. In the CBP, the KEPCO collects the elec-
tricity price from the customers on a regulated tariff and provides the variable costs 
(SMP and BLMP) plus the capacity payment for the generation companies.  
 
Originally, the futuristic model, namely Two Way Bidding Pool (TWBP) in which the market-
clearing price would be determined from the bids of customers and the offers of generation 
companies in the unconstrained dispatch, was supposed to commence in 2004 in order to 
overcome the shortcomings of the current CBP. However, the government halted it and ac-
cordingly the CBP is expected to continue for the time being. 
 
16.5.2 Pricing for Transmission Services under the Cost-Based Pool 
Now, the main drawback in the CBP is an essential absence of the location price signal. 
Though either nodal pricing that recognizes different prices at every location or zonal pric-
ing that creates administrative aggregations to reallocate costs is a nearly dominant answer 
to the prospective price signal in energy markets [23,24], it would be really time-consuming 
to rectify the current uniform pricing regime and, at the same time, redesign the market in 
terms of future network infrastructure costs. The access charge such as license plate or post-
age-stamp method is widely accepted to meet revenue expectations. In some European elec-
tricity markets, the power tracing method has been introduced for full cost recovery and 
location price signal [25]. 
 
16.5.2.1 The Basic Structure of Pricing for Transmission Services 
In general, the overall equipments of transmission system are grouped into connection as-
sets, common and location components, respectively. The pricing for transmission services 
in the CBP mainly consists of the access charge and the transmission usage charge as seen in 
Figure 16.15. 
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In general, the overall equipments of transmission system are grouped into connection as-
sets, common and location components, respectively. The pricing for transmission services 
in the CBP mainly consists of the access charge and the transmission usage charge as seen in 
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5) The zonal price, or a weighted average of the node price against the corresponding load-
demand within the same zone, is derived. 
 
16.5.3 Case Study 
Data from Korea electric power system is used to calculate transmission prices. Figure 16.18 
is a schematic showing locations of major generation and transmission facilities in the Korea 
electric power system. From the geographical point of view, the system can be characterized 
in the following [27] 
 Island system 
 Concentration of load demand in the metropolitan region 
 Location of major generation plants in non-metropolitan regions 
 Environmental concerns and restrictions on regional transmission siting. 
 
  Figure 16.18. Schematic of major transmission facilities in Korean electric power system 
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Figure 16.16. Illustration of transmission charges in the CBP 
 
 
Figure 16.17. Procedure of usage price calculation 
 
A natural implementation of the proposed algorithm is described in the following proce-
dures (see Figure 16.17):  
1) Choose 5 reference points when each load reaches 100, 90, 80, 70 and 60 % of peak load.  
2) The power tracing method is applied for 5-averaged load-demand and generation level at 
buses, allowing for a whole set of 5 reference points.  
3) The cost of each transmission line is calculated using equipment replacement cost which 
deals with what it will cost to replace the piece of equipment in the future and then converts 
the future cost into today's pricing. 
4) All 5-transmission prices as to each bus are created from a pair of the averaged demand 
and supply at the respective reference points. A weighted average of 5 transmission prices 
against the elapsed time is equal to the final transmission price at each bus. 
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charges as it is. Conversely, a group of independent power producers with the power 
plants in course of construction is installing the connection assets as long as their 
budget allows. That is, new entrants are being outright discriminated from the old 
ones in the CBP model. 
 It is even difficult for the existing generation companies to be imposed on the access 
charge in the CBP environment. That is why the market should reward those compa-
nies with the SMP, CP and infinitesimal reserve-related charge which are earmarked 
according to the generation fuel costs and installed generation capacity, and hence they 
can afford no extra payments for access charges, let alone the transmission prices. This 
critical defect is fairly associated with not only the access charges but also the trans-
mission pricing in itself.  
 For some generation companies, they are linked with the common components via the 
transmission line whose voltage might be as high as 765 kV. Those companies are fac-
ing a heavy burden with the enforcement of the capacity investments of the past.  
 Today and increasingly in the future, some parts of connection lines may be constructed 
across quite long-distance routes so as to be utilized for the common components. 
 
16.5.4.2 Transmission Usage Charge 
In relation to the transmission usage charge, the following questions can arise: 
 Further work will be needed since the allocation rules, with rating the shares of the 
generation companies and load entities or common and location components at fifty-
fifty, are totally unconvincing forceful standards. 
 In fact, the extent or systematic methodology of yielding location price signal should 
be discussed in a meticulous way and it should ultimately have a bearing on the ener-
gy market. But neither the CBP energy market nor capacity price provides location 
price signals between two areas. Therefore the pricing for transmission services to pro-
vide different location price signals between two areas is necessary. 
 The appropriateness or usefulness of the power tracing method will be analyzed in  
detail.  
 
The states of power systems are subject to change, relying solely on the planned mainten-
ance overhauls for generating units, new entry of power plants and the configuration of the 
infrastructure. Nonetheless, the ongoing method does not capture the changes of conditions 
in power systems, with the transmission price through the year fixed at a single value. It 
needs to be identified how much impact each of the factors have on the transmission price 
so that the transmission pricing should be able to enhance fairness and efficiency. 
 
Thus, in the face of much complication, the Korean government has been committed to 
putting the final touches on the public services in the electricity industry, reiterating its wil-
lingness to go ahead with the policy. The fruit of these incessant efforts has proved bitter as 
yet. In these staggering surroundings, it is a brilliant future task to see the inherent limita-
tions of the current Cost-Based Pool and find fundamental solutions without delay. To be 
sure, it will be allowed with the nation’s consent if there are attractive alternatives to the 
aforementioned tantalizing problems. Apparently, the transmission pricing should be a rea-
sonable economic indicator used by the market to make decisions on resource allocation, 
system expansion and reinforcement [28].  
The transmission price calculation algorithm used in NETA and Ireland is applied to the 
Korea electric power system for comparison with CBP method. In the results of simulations, 
it shows that the methods of NETA and Ireland provide stronger location signal than the 
CBP’s. In Figure 16.19, the left side of the horizontal axis indicates the nodes of metropolitan 
region and the right side indicates the nodes of non-metropolitan region. While there are 
negative prices in the metropolitan region for the methods of NETA and Ireland, there are 
all positive prices in the CBP’s method.  
 
Even though providing location price signals is an important role of pricing transmission 
services, it is undesirable that these methods should be applied to the Korean pool model. 
The reasons are as follows: 
 The energy markets of NETA and Ireland is run by contracts without location price  
signals. 
 Most of the electric power markets include capacity market or capacity payment. In 
CBP, capacity payment is paid to all generators who submit capacity offers. For exam-
ple, lower efficient generators in the metropolitan region make an additional profit on 
negative transmission price. 
 
 
 
Figure 16.19. Comparison with transmission price calculation algorithms 
 
16.5.4 The Challenges from Pricing Transmission Services in the Cost-Based Pool 
 
16.5.4.1 Access Charge 
 Though it is clearly stated that the already established generation companies in the 
CBP should take the responsibility for the access charges, they do not pay for these 
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CBP should take the responsibility for the access charges, they do not pay for these 
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It provides exclusive rights for a single transmission and dispatch company to purchase all 
electricity from generators and then sell it to distributors [30].  
 
The single-buyer model became popular in the CIS countries and elsewhere because of 
technical, economic, and institutional reasons. These include: 
● Balancing of electricity input and output is facilitated by a single dispatch method in 
real-time. 
● The “contract path” problem is avoided. 
● The single-buyer model is usually responsive to the sector Ministry in the areas of gen-
eration capacity investment and state-owned company’s financial affairs. The most in-
fluential stakeholders favor this. 
● Price regulation is simplified, maintaining a unified wholesale price. 
● The single-buyer model is favored by politicians who do not agree with a complete 
withdrawal of the state from wholesale electricity trading. 
 
There is evidence, however, that it is more efficacious to adopt a market model that has mul-
tiple buyers formed immediately after unbundling, in areas such as the CIS. The single-
buyer model is criticized because it tends to place generation capacity expansion decisions 
in government officials’ hands, which do not assume the financial consequences. This model 
also makes the state ultimately responsible for poor power purchase agreements that cannot 
be honored. This is regularly part of the contract agreement. This model also does not re-
spond well to reductions in electricity demand. Wholesale electricity prices will rise in re-
sponse to demand reduction because of fixed capacity charges, which must be applied to a 
reduced volume of electricity purchases. Another drawback is the under-development of 
cross-border power trade. This is because the state-owned single-buyer has very little profit 
motive. This can cause long-term problems when a neighboring country or region develops 
a more liberalized power market model. Incentives for distributors to collect payments from 
customers are also reduced. Again, politically unpopular decisions are difficult for a state-
owned entity. This is important because in the single-buyer model, delinquent payments 
from distributors are assumed by the aggregated cash proceeds of the single-buyer. Paying 
and non-paying distributors are treated basically the same, weakening the resolve of dis-
tributors to enhance the collection of payments. Another political intervention in this model 
has been experienced in the Ukraine and Poland. In these countries, groups have lobbied on 
behalf of coal miners to provide special treatment for coal-fired power plants. Interestingly, 
because of the political advantages of the single-buyer model, some governments have sig-
nificantly delayed the next “phase” of fully liberalized markets [30]. 
 
The CIS has experienced advances in the privatization of the power sector. For example, 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Moldova and the Ukraine have either contracted 
the management of electric companies, or sold generation companies and distribution elec-
tric grids. Modernization through the construction of energy facilities has been facilitated by 
the creation of a legal basis. This has attracted direct investments in improvement projects 
from internal and external sources. For example, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan have received investments in projects ranging from hydro power 
plants, steam gas turbine units to electricity grid restoration [29].  
 
16.6 Economic Convergence Points of Russian, CIS and Asian Power Markets 
The convergence of Asian power markets crosses political and geographical boundaries. 
This Section provides an analysis of the technical and economic commonalities involved. 
The two primary goals of power sector reforms have been liberalization and the establish-
ment of a competitive power market.  
 
This Section discusses the fundamentals of cooperation, and the primary goals of power 
sector reforms. The main reform priorities and primary strategic areas are discussed in the 
context of the developing power market in Russia. Also the Section makes the point that 
despite the large geographical area, and economic disparity of Asian countries, there are 
commonalities to be considered in power sector reform. Each country should create a reform 
methodology in a national and regional conceptualization.  
 
It is explained that there are five common steps on which this can be based. Additionally, 
when determining the correct model to apply to an economy to bring about the desired effi-
ciencies, it is important to consider 13 transitional issues. 
 
16.6.1 Economic Analysis of Russian and CIS Power Sector  
Interconnections and Markets 
The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) power sector has been characterized by 
cooperation, liberalization, privatization, investment, and cross border integration of elec-
tricity markets [29]. The fundamentals of cooperation have been stated in the CIS agreement 
entitled “On coordination of interstate relations in the field of electricity of the Common-
wealth of Independent States” signed in February 1992. Arising from this agreement, coop-
eration has been implemented in the areas of structural reforms, power system integration, 
legislation and price liberalization. This is in response to serious power sector problems ex-
perienced by CIS countries in financial, technical, operational, and investment areas. As a 
group, the CIS countries faced additional crises because of the 12 members, only four; Azer-
baijan, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Turkmenistan have enough fuel and energy resources to 
cover internal demand.  
 
The primary goals of power sector reforms in the CIS have been liberalization and the estab-
lishment of a competitive power market. This has been conceived, since 1996, as a complex 
process, based upon relevant technological, structural and legislative foundations [29]. 
Many of the CIS countries have phased-in the process of power sector reforms. These re-
forms have followed previous global experiences by de-integrating vertically integrated 
monopolies into distinct distribution, transmission, and generation companies. This has 
established the foundational single-buyer model of market reform, in preparation for more 
liberalization. The single-buyer model was introduced in developing countries in the 1990s. 
                                                                 
 The CIS is composed of: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Rus-
sia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan.  In October, 2000, the heads of five countries (Bela-
rus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan) signed an agreement on the creation of the Eurasian 
Economic Community.  Armenia, Moldova and Ukraine have observer status under EAEC. In October, 
2005, Uzbekistan agreed to join this organization.  In September 2003, four countries (Belarus, Kazakhstan, 
Russia and Ukraine) signed an agreement on the Formation of CES (Common Economic Space). 
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electricity from generators and then sell it to distributors [30].  
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● Price regulation is simplified, maintaining a unified wholesale price. 
● The single-buyer model is favored by politicians who do not agree with a complete 
withdrawal of the state from wholesale electricity trading. 
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buyer model is criticized because it tends to place generation capacity expansion decisions 
in government officials’ hands, which do not assume the financial consequences. This model 
also makes the state ultimately responsible for poor power purchase agreements that cannot 
be honored. This is regularly part of the contract agreement. This model also does not re-
spond well to reductions in electricity demand. Wholesale electricity prices will rise in re-
sponse to demand reduction because of fixed capacity charges, which must be applied to a 
reduced volume of electricity purchases. Another drawback is the under-development of 
cross-border power trade. This is because the state-owned single-buyer has very little profit 
motive. This can cause long-term problems when a neighboring country or region develops 
a more liberalized power market model. Incentives for distributors to collect payments from 
customers are also reduced. Again, politically unpopular decisions are difficult for a state-
owned entity. This is important because in the single-buyer model, delinquent payments 
from distributors are assumed by the aggregated cash proceeds of the single-buyer. Paying 
and non-paying distributors are treated basically the same, weakening the resolve of dis-
tributors to enhance the collection of payments. Another political intervention in this model 
has been experienced in the Ukraine and Poland. In these countries, groups have lobbied on 
behalf of coal miners to provide special treatment for coal-fired power plants. Interestingly, 
because of the political advantages of the single-buyer model, some governments have sig-
nificantly delayed the next “phase” of fully liberalized markets [30]. 
 
The CIS has experienced advances in the privatization of the power sector. For example, 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Moldova and the Ukraine have either contracted 
the management of electric companies, or sold generation companies and distribution elec-
tric grids. Modernization through the construction of energy facilities has been facilitated by 
the creation of a legal basis. This has attracted direct investments in improvement projects 
from internal and external sources. For example, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan have received investments in projects ranging from hydro power 
plants, steam gas turbine units to electricity grid restoration [29].  
 
16.6 Economic Convergence Points of Russian, CIS and Asian Power Markets 
The convergence of Asian power markets crosses political and geographical boundaries. 
This Section provides an analysis of the technical and economic commonalities involved. 
The two primary goals of power sector reforms have been liberalization and the establish-
ment of a competitive power market.  
 
This Section discusses the fundamentals of cooperation, and the primary goals of power 
sector reforms. The main reform priorities and primary strategic areas are discussed in the 
context of the developing power market in Russia. Also the Section makes the point that 
despite the large geographical area, and economic disparity of Asian countries, there are 
commonalities to be considered in power sector reform. Each country should create a reform 
methodology in a national and regional conceptualization.  
 
It is explained that there are five common steps on which this can be based. Additionally, 
when determining the correct model to apply to an economy to bring about the desired effi-
ciencies, it is important to consider 13 transitional issues. 
 
16.6.1 Economic Analysis of Russian and CIS Power Sector  
Interconnections and Markets 
The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) power sector has been characterized by 
cooperation, liberalization, privatization, investment, and cross border integration of elec-
tricity markets [29]. The fundamentals of cooperation have been stated in the CIS agreement 
entitled “On coordination of interstate relations in the field of electricity of the Common-
wealth of Independent States” signed in February 1992. Arising from this agreement, coop-
eration has been implemented in the areas of structural reforms, power system integration, 
legislation and price liberalization. This is in response to serious power sector problems ex-
perienced by CIS countries in financial, technical, operational, and investment areas. As a 
group, the CIS countries faced additional crises because of the 12 members, only four; Azer-
baijan, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Turkmenistan have enough fuel and energy resources to 
cover internal demand.  
 
The primary goals of power sector reforms in the CIS have been liberalization and the estab-
lishment of a competitive power market. This has been conceived, since 1996, as a complex 
process, based upon relevant technological, structural and legislative foundations [29]. 
Many of the CIS countries have phased-in the process of power sector reforms. These re-
forms have followed previous global experiences by de-integrating vertically integrated 
monopolies into distinct distribution, transmission, and generation companies. This has 
established the foundational single-buyer model of market reform, in preparation for more 
liberalization. The single-buyer model was introduced in developing countries in the 1990s. 
                                                                 
 The CIS is composed of: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Rus-
sia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan.  In October, 2000, the heads of five countries (Bela-
rus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan) signed an agreement on the creation of the Eurasian 
Economic Community.  Armenia, Moldova and Ukraine have observer status under EAEC. In October, 
2005, Uzbekistan agreed to join this organization.  In September 2003, four countries (Belarus, Kazakhstan, 
Russia and Ukraine) signed an agreement on the Formation of CES (Common Economic Space). 
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The primary strategic areas are: 
● To create a Kazakhstan unified energy system (UES). 
● To restore the synchronous network with Russia, and other energy networks of central 
Asia. 
● To further develop an open and competitive market for electric power. 
● To commission new generation capacity to offset power imports. 
 
Assuming these priorities, it is useful to view Kazakhstan as a precursor to significant, simi-
lar changes in Russia. In 1990, the electricity shortage in Kazakhstan reached a level of 17.3 
billion kWh [33]. This shortage was made up by power imported from Kyrgyzstan, Russia 
and Uzbekistan. In 1996, the state generation and power grid monopoly was the object of 
reform, with the aim to create a competitive power market. That year, the government in-
itiated a program to privatize and restructure the power sector formalized by Decision No. 
663 of May 1996. Because of this decision, large generators were sold to investors, and a grid 
company was created to own and maintain the high voltage grid assets, including voltage 
levels of 1150, 500 and 220 kV. Additional decisions (1188 of September, 1996 and 1193 of 
July, 1997) provided a model for Kazakhstan to follow for the creation of an electricity mar-
ket. Designed for competition, the single electricity market would have two levels, whole-
sale and retail. The trade of electricity would be based upon fixed date bilateral purchases 
and transactions, and agreements on grid capacity. The competitive model would be 
brought about by pro-active changes in the electricity sector: 
 
Restructuring to create an effective, competitive market based on forwards contracts under 
the supervisory control of a centralized dispatch. 
 
A testing period for competitive market principles and enhanced quality indicators, espe-
cially regarding current frequency. 
 
The creation of a pool of reserves – comprising a market of electricity reserves. 
 
As of 2003, the wholesale power market is functioning on the basis of bilateral contracts. The 
electricity exchange for day in advance power purchases was established in February 2002. 
The total volume of sales at the exchange is considered to be 7 % to 10 % of the total supply 
of electricity for Kazakhstan [34]. 
 
Hirschhausen and Waelde [35] have posited that an economic transition period from socia-
listic to capitalistic markets, especially in energy, no longer exists. Interestingly, the authors 
make the critical point that experience with emulating institutional models has shown that 
they often work very differently for the emulator than the emulated. Utilizing an institu-
tional interpretation of energy sector reform in the CIS, the authors contend that the transi-
tion from socialistic to market based economies has led to diverse outcomes. These differing 
outcomes are based primarily upon the pre-existing formal and informal institutions that 
dominate the particular country. The CIS countries have looked to Western market econo-
mies as models for the restructuring of their power sectors. Two diametric cases that have 
been studied are the UK and French approach. The authors qualify this statement by sug-
gesting that there is no theoretically or empirically discernable best practice to structure and 
There has been ongoing integration, and re-integration of the CIS power systems. For exam-
ple, in June 2000, the power system connections of Russia and Kazakhstan were restored. 
Since the autumn of 2001, 11 of the 12 CIS countries have re-synchronized their power sys-
tems as an interconnected power system of the Commonwealth of Independent States (IPS-
CIS) [29]. Additionally, the CIS is involved with power exchanges and trade with the neigh-
boring countries of Afghanistan, China, Finland, Hungary, Iran, Norway, Poland, and Slo-
vakia. The CIS power authorities believe that cross-border synchronization is beneficial be-
cause it places better use of existing generation capacity, provides emergency assistance 
options, and harmonizes standards in the areas of safety, ecology, and technology. 
 
As part of an economic analysis of Eastern Europe and CIS transitional development from 
centralized planning to free market forces, a framework is used to evaluate the impact of 
infrastructure upgrades [31]. Research has indicated that “The potential for developing competi-
tive markets in transition economies had been inhibited by the inadequacy of both the institutional 
and physical infrastructure inherited from the socialist era.” Although the following are general 
recommendations for transition economies, the following economic contributions of market-
enabling infrastructure can be applied to the power sector: 
● Market Selection: By increasing market competition, infrastructure investments that re-
duce transaction costs reduce the market share of higher-cost firms. This raises the av-
erage production efficiency of the economy. 
● Infrastructure Investments: If these investments increase product market competition, incen-
tives for firms should change to help reduce their costs by engaging in a restructuring plan. 
● Increasing Market Share: If lower cost firms enter the market, they have probably been 
attracted by an infrastructure that lowers transaction costs (European Bank, 2000). 
 
Therefore, each investment project in the CIS power sector can be evaluated in terms of the 
contributions of direct market selection, restructuring and entry. 
 
The primary problem with the power sector in Russia, in the context of the CIS, has been in-
adequate investment [32]. Reasons for this are found historically, primarily being a lack of in-
vestment in generation capacity, and increased industrial activity and subsequent higher de-
mand. A main goal has been to attract internal and external large-scale investments to the po-
tentially competitive elements of the power sector. Although Russia has formed a plan, crafted 
in 2001, to eventually liberalize wholesale and retail electricity tariffs and to privatize segments 
of the sector, other contiguous CIS members have taken a lead in reformation. Kazakhstan was 
a reform leader by unbundling transmission, distribution and generation. Most generation and 
distribution assets have been privatized, but transmission networks are still owned by the 
government. In April 1999, the government of Kazakhstan approved a program to develop the 
electric power sector, with a view to 2030 [33]. The main priorities are: 
● To have economic and population self-reliance in electric power, and to have energy in-
dependence as part of national security. 
● To create competitive resources for electric power export to supply energy markets of 
contiguous and third countries. 
● To develop a competitive electric power market on the basis of electric power transport 
and distribution networks accessible for generators and a system to control power flow. 
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16.6.2 Convergence of Asian Power Markets 
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, (APEC), created in 1989 to continue to stimulate regional 
economic growth, has remained a consensus-based entity, without binding agreements [37]. 
APEC, although a non-treaty based organization, is having a significant impact on the reform 
of the Russian economy, including the Russian power sector. The primary purposes of APEC 
have been to encourage economic growth, trade, investment and cooperation in the Asia-
Pacific region. APEC is a 21-member organization, each called a Member Economy, 
representing 47% of global trade. The APEC Member Economies include the Russian Federa-
tion as an integral participant. Particular themes can be found in APEC interests, including:  
● Reduction of tariffs. 
● Efficient domestic economies. 
● Increased exports. 
 
Other APEC activities include policy creation and economic cooperation to facilitate the 
exchange of products across regional borders [37]. 
 
Established, and ongoing studies of the APEC economic area electricity supply industry 
have indicated that reform in the developed economy members has been designed to im-
prove efficiency in the sector. In contrast, the developing economy members have sought 
reform because of partial access to electricity supply, low infrastructure investment, uneco-
nomic pricing of electricity, and inability to manage high demand growth [38]. The progress 
of microeconomic reform of the APEC electricity sector has been steady across both devel-
oped and developing member economies. Despite the large geographical area, and econom-
ic disparity of member economies, an APEC energy-working group has concluded that there 
are commonalities to be considered in electric sector reform: 
● Governments remain responsible for the outcome of reform, even after industry re-
structuring takes place. 
● If governments cannot demonstrate the success of reform programs, there may be po-
litical consequences. 
● Reform needs to be conceptualized to each member economy based on needs, circums-
tances, and resources. 
● Despite advances in a competitive electric market, electric security and stability of the 
entire system must always take precedence. 
 ● Restructuring has been defined as a “break-up” of generation and supply, which are 
contestable, and mostly non-competitive elements of transmission and distribution. 
● The introduction of a competitive electricity market will create high risk for consumers 
if supply is unreliable, or becomes unreliable. High levels of competition are not ap-
propriate for developing economies in the early stages of electric sector reform. 
● If the impetus is to keep the electricity market at a marginally competitive level, other 
aspects of the system can be made more competitive. The separation of the transmis-
sion system and the creation of a competitive system to acquire primary and secondary 
energy are examples. 
                                                                 
  APEC's 21 Member Economies are: Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, People's Republic of 
China, (Hong Kong, China), Indonesia, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Pa-
pua New Guinea, Peru, The Republic of the Philippines, The Russian Federation, Singapore, Chinese 
Taipei, Thailand, United States of America and Viet Nam. 
regulate the global energy sector. The CIS, including Russia, however, have overwhelmingly 
chosen the UK (British) approach which has been reproduced in Australia, Canada, New 
Zealand, Scandinavia, and several U.S. states. This approach has been marked by very direct 
privatization, corporatization, and competition. The French system, in contrast, has essen-
tially maintained integrated monopolies protected from competition. Despite the similarities 
found in the French and formerly Soviet approaches, linked by a dominating public service 
obligation and a close relationship between management and politics, the French system has 
not been the model of choice for the CIS. The initial elements of the approaches found in 
most CIS countries have been to: 
● Identify appropriate reform models from international experiences, 
● Attempt to re-produce those models in an effective way domestically, 
● Allow the domestic model to emerge and evolve with conceptualized principles [35]. 
 
Interestingly, after surveying international examples, some countries such as Russia and the 
Ukraine have crafted early proposals that have included additional competitive elements. 
This enthusiasm for the UK approach can be tied to what is perceived as superior wealth 
generation, technological innovation and swiftness of economic response to the needs of the 
market. Possibly most importantly to consider, Hirschhausen and Waelde [35] indicate that 
the AC connection of Poland and other east European countries to the West European grid 
was an external impetus to modernization. This is an important recognition of the relation 
between the physical connections of electricity grids of distinct systems, and the subsequent 
need to reform such areas as security, technical requirements, quality and communication. 
Indeed, this is demonstrated by the relationship of technical and economic needs of the Jap-
anese power grid interconnection (PGI) considered with Eurasia. Arakawa [36] suggests that 
a major issue concerning Japan’s PGI is the “eventual interconnection of the Japanese power sys-
tem with the Eurasian mainland [which] will be achieved with restructuring of Japan’s electric power 
market to be freely competitive. In addition, the relationship between Japan and Russia must be im-
proved to a point that the neighboring nations will be able to cooperate, for example, in mutual devel-
opment of Siberian natural resources. Apart from political and economic concerns, no major technical 
difficulties in PGI are anticipated”.  
 
Projects such as the potential Japanese-Eurasian interconnection can be financed through three 
main approaches, (1) public ownership, (2) public-private partnership, and (3) private owner-
ship. Though not the primary focus of this Section, more rigorous analyses of potential Asian 
interconnections should be carried out before assuming the existence of financial, capacity, or 
reserve capacity incentives. For instance, if the potential interconnections are between two 
monopolies, then analyses can be carried out using bilateral monopoly trade theory. This 
would be particularly useful with a monophony – monopoly power market scenario. Howev-
er, in this scenario, the Nash equilibrium theorem cannot be used because the asymmetry 
found between distinct systems discounts the determination of a unique price. 
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pua New Guinea, Peru, The Republic of the Philippines, The Russian Federation, Singapore, Chinese 
Taipei, Thailand, United States of America and Viet Nam. 
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ship. Though not the primary focus of this Section, more rigorous analyses of potential Asian 
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reserve capacity incentives. For instance, if the potential interconnections are between two 
monopolies, then analyses can be carried out using bilateral monopoly trade theory. This 
would be particularly useful with a monophony – monopoly power market scenario. Howev-
er, in this scenario, the Nash equilibrium theorem cannot be used because the asymmetry 
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Allocated efficiency, which are the way resources are utilized, in the light of appropriate sig-
nals for investment and consumption. 
 
Dynamic efficiency, which is the extent that innovation and productivity increases are encour-
aged over a specific duration [39]. 
 
Critically, when determining the correct model to apply to an economy to bring about the de-
sired efficiencies, it is important to consider transitional issues. These transitional issues in-
clude:  
 
Ownership 
If the current model of the power sector is a state-owned monopoly, full privatization should 
be delayed until it can be determined that the new companies will be viable, and after new 
markets have been tested.  
 
Incumbents 
If competition is introduced, incumbent utilities are under an obligation to reduce operating 
costs, and to develop new strategies and new markets to supply power to. The restructuring of 
the industry creates new risks for incumbent utilities. This includes the areas of finance, regu-
lation and politics. As an example, generators can have competition amongst local power sup-
pliers. Additionally, as the electricity grid becomes more interconnected, with more room for 
capacity, interstate and international generators then add to the competitive marketplace. 
 
Stranded Costs 
Stranded costs are the historical costs, mainly through generation plant construction, that may 
not be recoverable in the new prices charged in a competitive market. Generally, there are four 
types of stranded costs: 
1) New generating plants could out-compete old plants, necessitating the decommissioning of 
older plants. 
2) Competition can provide lower cost, long-term fuel or power purchasing contracts. Utilities 
bound to uneconomic contracts have higher input costs, and consequently a loss in earnings, 
making recovery difficult. 
3) Utilities that have been obligated to invest in “regulatory assets” can find that the regulatory 
regime can change under a competitive environment, reducing their protective “extended pay-
ment plans” by deregulated, lower prices. 
4) Other public policy programs such as Demand Side Management (DSM) programs can be 
stranded, as their cost recovery will become impossible in a deregulated system [39]. 
 
Although full recovery of stranded costs are rare, most experts in the field agree that govern-
ments should pay utilities for stranded costs, on a case by case basis, based upon specific 
attributes of the utilities in question. 
 
Security of Supply 
Two primary aspects of security of supply must be considered when planning and implement-
ing a transition to competitive markets. They are the securing of long duration sources of gen-
eration fuels and the reliability of the power system. 
 
● The historical emergence of competitive electricity markets has arisen “naturally” from 
trade between distinct power systems via sub-national and national power system in-
terconnections. 
● Under pricing of electricity removes much of the incentive to invest in infrastructure. 
● There is no “reform standard”. This being the case, it is important to create an objective 
setting, monitoring and measuring system to manage reform. 
● Highly valuable empirical reform experience can be lost. It is important to retain ta-
lented experience for ongoing institution building [38]. 
 
Importantly, it can be maintained that each member economy should create a reform me-
thodology in a regional and national conceptualization. However, there are five common 
steps that this can be based upon: 
● Create national policy objectives. 
● Identify reform risks. 
● Assume and implement reform strategies that are realistic. 
● Project-manage the reforms. 
● Create an institutional unit to consistently monitor the progress of reforms. 
 
Interestingly, the research methodology used by the APEC energy working group was com-
posed of a literature review, interviews of reform participants in APEC economies, cross-
sectional assessments of the current status of reform, and applications of practical expe-
rience in case studies of developed and developing economies in APEC. Overall reform of 
the electricity sector has been divided into eight primary sections: 
● Policy objectives 
● Management 
● Structure 
● Framework for law and regulation 
● Mechanisms for wholesale market 
● Transmission and distribution 
● Retail tariffs 
● Privatization [39]. 
 
By utilizing mixed research methodologies to provide analyses, each of these eight sections 
has strategic principles designed to provide common points of reference for reform, and to 
also provide the basis for a conceptualized approach. Interestingly, Principle 35, under 
Wholesale Market Mechanisms, states: “The establishment of a competitive wholesale market 
should only be considered in the context of overall market structure and design” [39]. Wholesale 
market mechanisms should be able to interface with regulatory frameworks, transmission 
and distribution planning, and access. This should account for the need to provide cost ef-
fective supply from generation to the distribution connecting points. Competitive wholesale 
market mechanisms are integral to overall power system reform planning and implementa-
tion. The primary aim of power system reform should be to improve economic efficiency. This 
can be divided into three areas: 
 
Productive efficiency, which is the relationship between production input and output, and the 
implementation of best practice concepts. 
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Reflecting the theme that suggests that each country, including the APEC members, should 
conceptualize a reform program designed on one or many models, the APEC energy working 
group states, “The circumstances of each APEC economy present unique issues and problems in de-
signing regulatory aspects of market reforms. What has succeeded in other economies may not be appro-
priate in a particular economy in Asia.” This is substantiated by the prominence that Russia holds 
as a case study when looking at APEC area electricity sector deregulation [40].  
 
Indeed, Belyaev, et. al. [41], foreshadowing Arakawa [36], indicates that the interconnection of 
electric power systems, to broaden power markets, is expanding internationally. The North-
East Asia region, composed of China, Japan, North and South Korea, and the Far East area of 
Russia hold the highest potential to design and implement interstate interconnections. The east 
Siberian area, including the Krasnoyarsk and Irkutsk electric power systems, has a surplus of 
capacity. This extra capacity is because of reduced exports to the European and Ural part of 
Russia as the industrial economy has been in decline. Consequently, and for example, energy 
experts at the Irkutsk, Russia electric utility have concluded that it is possible for an economi-
cally efficient interconnection between Irkutsk and China, exporting, respectively, up to 3 GW 
[41]. Plans such as this are supported by published policies of APEC [42]. Cross-border trans-
mission networks, as planned in APEC, are perceived to strengthen the security, quality and 
flexibility of energy supply. 
 
Thus, it is important to adopt a market model that has multiple buyers formed immediately 
after unbundling, in areas such as the CIS. CIS cross-border synchronization is beneficial be-
cause it places better use of existing generation capacity, provides emergency assistance op-
tions, and harmonizes standards in the areas of safety, ecology, and technology.  
 
It is thought that the economic transition period from socialistic to capitalistic markets, espe-
cially in energy, no longer exists. Experience with utilizing institutional models has shown that 
they often work very differently for the emulator than the emulated.  
 
Wholesale market mechanisms should be able to interface with regulatory frameworks, 
transmission and distribution planning, and access. This should account for the need to pro-
vide cost effective supply from generation to the distribution connecting points.  
 
The primary aim of power system reform should be to improve economic efficiency. The eco-
nomic milieu of each economy presents unique issues and problems when designing regulato-
ry aspects of market reforms. What has succeeded in other economies may not be appropriate 
in a particular economy in Asia. 
 
16.7 The Globalization of Energy Markets in Asia 
Energy market globalization is deepening and broadening, not only through international 
trade but also through cross-investments, deregulation of domestic markets, and industrial 
restructuring that links the older energy industries to the new global political economy. This 
transformation of energy industries and markets is apparent around the world, and it offers 
great promise in terms of economic efficiency, technology development, and consumer choice. 
 
Investment 
It has been found that competition in generation can reduce incentives to invest, and lower 
operating costs. In building the reform of the power system, it is important to create a system 
for signaling the need for generation capacity and power grid improvement. 
 
Reliability 
Reliability, by definition, is moving from strictly technical reliability to economic reliability. 
Economic reliability is composed of a contractual arrangement between generators, distribu-
tors, and consumers, reflecting a certain level of reliability. 
 
Transparency 
Pricing mechanisms in a monopolistic system often are subsidized to appease social policy 
requirements. However, in a deregulated market, consumers should eventually be able to 
choose their own retail supplier. In this arrangement, consumers need accurate and transpa-
rent information regarding price and service. 
 
Social Policy 
Although government is responsible for social policy, it is recommended that energy policy 
not be an element of social policy. A newly designed regulatory system can be crafted to syn-
chronize public and private interests. 
 
Equity 
The government as a consequence of deregulation may no longer maintain universal service 
obligations. Low-income customers may need to be assisted by direct government funding. 
 
Consumer Protection 
It is possible that industrial customers will benefit more from deregulation than residential 
ones. Regulation will need to be applied to enforce appropriate competition laws. 
 
Pricing Issues 
It is important to manage prices as a country transitions from one power market model to 
another. Two areas are commonly found: price increases and reduction of employment levels. 
Price increases may be made more gradual, especially by utilizing subsidies, efficiency im-
provements, enhanced competition and disbursement of consumer information. 
 
Reform and the Environment  
As a wholesale power market develops to be more competitive, there is more pressure to run 
plants that have a lower cost of production. It is possible that these lower costs of production 
plants emit the most harmful contaminants into the environment. Though not intrinsic to the 
reform process, it is recommended that environmental policy evolve at the same time as eco-
nomic and social policy. 
 
Regulation 
Market power is a central issue in deregulation, and requires a regulatory regime to constrain 
non-competitive manipulation of the market. 
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discuss the cooperative work in energy, trade and investment, transportation, telecommuni-
cation and tourism. The UNDP is providing administrative and consultancy service for this 
series of meetings, and the IEA was invited to become a collaborating organization in the 
energy part of this program. 
 
 
Figure 16.20. The potential Northeast Asia power market 
 
In June 2001, an international symposium on Northeast Asian energy cooperation was held 
in Seoul jointly by UN/ESCAP (United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia 
and the Pacific), KEEI (Korea Energy Economics Institute), and IEEJ (The Institute of Energy 
Economics, Japan). In this conference, a necessity to build an inter-governmental communi-
cation channel was suggested. Based on this discussion, a senior government officials meet-
ing among Russia, Mongolia, Korea and DPRK was held in Vladivostok on 8-10 April 2005. 
The IEA was invited as a guest speaker to share the Member countries’ experience in energy 
trade with Russia. A second session of this senior officials meeting was scheduled in No-
vember 2005. 
 
In addition to the internal energy cooperation within the Northeast Asian region, the coop-
eration between ASEAN and Northeast Asian countries is getting stronger. Since the ten 
member states of ASEAN have limited resources to nourish their own economic develop-
ment, the partnerships with Japan, China and Korea have great significance. In this case, a 
collaborative relationship with ASEAN+3 can even benefit DPRK, Mongolia and Far-East 
Russia as well. There have been continuous talks and meetings since 1999 among these 
countries not only on energy cooperation but also all possible economic partnerships. These 
efforts were accelerated by ASEAN+3 Summits and will have substantial impacts on energy 
security of Northeast Asian region. 
 
Considering that the Northeast Asian region accounts for more than one fifth of the world’s 
energy consumption and is expected to account for one-third of the world’s total energy 
demand increase over the next 20 years, it is certain that the energy integration of this region 
The process of energy globalization is uneven, however, and some of its impacts will present 
new challenges for strategic planners. What new relationships are developing between pro-
ducers and consumers, and between buyers and sellers? Who are the winners and losers? In a 
context of opening energy markets, why is there renewed concern about energy security 
around the world today? What types of security challenges will energy globalization present 
during the next two decades? 
 
There are varying approaches to energy security in a context of market globalization. The 
United States supports market-oriented energy policies at home and abroad that open tradi-
tionally closed markets to new forms of competition and restructuring. Asia, a region where 
the United States has vast security stakes and where the most rapid increases in oil and gas 
imports are projected in the next two decades, deserves special attention. Policymakers in Asia 
and other countries worry that the market alone will not ensure energy security. The United 
States has generally pursued energy security on a different track, making Persian Gulf security 
a high priority.  
 
To promote the cooperation and mutual interdependence that open energy markets require, it 
will be necessary to explore different approaches to energy security, analyze some of the unin-
tended security risks that globalization of energy markets entails, and draw conclusions about 
the implications for U.S. security. Although the United States has already made large invest-
ments in Asian security, new multilateral approaches will be needed to pre-empt and mitigate 
the energy-related disruptions that may lie ahead. Defending the sea-lanes, to take an example, 
will be more important than ever in the future, but ensuring freedom of transit will require 
new multilateral efforts that cannot be simply subsumed under traditional alliances. Although 
the United States will have adequate access to energy supplies, it may be drawn into energy-
related disputes, as weak states fragment, and producers and others seek to exert political le-
verage via energy supplies and infrastructure. Despite the uncertainties and difficulties of mul-
tilateral initiatives, it will be necessary to use them to address myriad energy-related security 
problems that are likely to arise as unintended consequences of energy market globalization.  
This Section presents the globalization of energy markets in Asia [43-51]. 
 
16.7.1 Energy Challenges in Northeast Asia 
 
16.7.1.1 Recent Progress in Energy Integration in Northeast Asia 
In the IEA [WJL1] programs, Northeast Asia, Figure 16.20, includes Northeast China (Hei-
longjiang, Liaoning and Jilin Provinces), East Siberia and the Far East of Russia (mainly Sak-
halin Islands and Saha Republic), Mongolia, and Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 
(DPRK). These countries and areas form a unique region in terms of energy supply lines 
together with Japan and Korea. 
 
Recently, there has been increasing interest to integrate this area with various cross-border 
energy development projects and, in fact, several regional and international organizations 
have begun to put in serious effort to tackle this issue. Since June 2000, the United Nations 
Development Plan (UNDP) has held the international program called TRADP (Tumen River 
Area Development Program) among five Northeast Asian countries (China, Russia, Mongo-
lia, Korea and DPRK) has organized annual meetings among the National Coordinators to 
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will be necessary to explore different approaches to energy security, analyze some of the unin-
tended security risks that globalization of energy markets entails, and draw conclusions about 
the implications for U.S. security. Although the United States has already made large invest-
ments in Asian security, new multilateral approaches will be needed to pre-empt and mitigate 
the energy-related disruptions that may lie ahead. Defending the sea-lanes, to take an example, 
will be more important than ever in the future, but ensuring freedom of transit will require 
new multilateral efforts that cannot be simply subsumed under traditional alliances. Although 
the United States will have adequate access to energy supplies, it may be drawn into energy-
related disputes, as weak states fragment, and producers and others seek to exert political le-
verage via energy supplies and infrastructure. Despite the uncertainties and difficulties of mul-
tilateral initiatives, it will be necessary to use them to address myriad energy-related security 
problems that are likely to arise as unintended consequences of energy market globalization.  
This Section presents the globalization of energy markets in Asia [43-51]. 
 
16.7.1 Energy Challenges in Northeast Asia 
 
16.7.1.1 Recent Progress in Energy Integration in Northeast Asia 
In the IEA [WJL1] programs, Northeast Asia, Figure 16.20, includes Northeast China (Hei-
longjiang, Liaoning and Jilin Provinces), East Siberia and the Far East of Russia (mainly Sak-
halin Islands and Saha Republic), Mongolia, and Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 
(DPRK). These countries and areas form a unique region in terms of energy supply lines 
together with Japan and Korea. 
 
Recently, there has been increasing interest to integrate this area with various cross-border 
energy development projects and, in fact, several regional and international organizations 
have begun to put in serious effort to tackle this issue. Since June 2000, the United Nations 
Development Plan (UNDP) has held the international program called TRADP (Tumen River 
Area Development Program) among five Northeast Asian countries (China, Russia, Mongo-
lia, Korea and DPRK) has organized annual meetings among the National Coordinators to 
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● Lower coincident peak load (compared with the sum of individual peak loads), mutual 
access to generation reserves for interconnected systems, a more robust power supply 
to meet such unexpected events as load growth above forecast or delayed commission-
ing of generation and transmission projects, and increased system reliability. 
● Lower greenhouse gas emissions and other pollutants, largely due to a shift from 
thermal to hydro generation in the long-term.  
 
 
Figure 16.21. The potential East Asian power market 
 
There is growing interest in cross-border bilateral power trade in the sub region, spear-
headed by private developers in Lao PDR selling power to Thailand. The government of 
Thailand has agreed to buy 3,000 MW from these private power developers from 2006, and 
several independent power producer (IPP) projects are moving ahead. China’s Ministry of 
Electric Power is encouraging studies of the export potential of Yunnan’s planned Jing Hong 
hydropower plant and associated transmission lines to Thailand, through Lao PDR, with the 
support of the Lao and Thai governments. The Vietnam and Lao governments have signed a 
memorandum of understanding on purchases of about 2,000 MW of power by 2010. 
 
16.7.3 Energy Market Globalization  
Does it matter that globalization is unfolding unevenly and that policy priorities for enhanc-
ing energy security are defined differently in the United States, Europe, and Asia? Tradi-
tionally, analysts have focused on the potential for military conflict over energy resources as 
the primary threat. Extrapolating 20 years ahead, based on consensus supply-and-demand 
projections that show sharp increases in Asia’s energy requirements; a number of energy-
related issues are likely to generate new types of problems and unintended consequences 
associated with deepening globalization. To the extent that globalized energy markets more 
will have a significant impact on world energy security. This is good ground for IEA Secre-
tariat attention to the energy development in this area. 
 
16.7.1.2 The On-going Energy Integration Projects in Northeast Asia 
One of the distinguishing features of Northeast Asia is that, in spite of both immense energy 
demand and abundant energy resources that exist in the region, the region remains segre-
gated. On the demand side, the most critical issue of the three major energy importing coun-
tries- Japan, China, and Korea- is their high dependency on imported oil, especially from the 
Middle East. Therefore, the common denominator for these large energy consuming coun-
tries is diversification of the energy sources, i.e., the need to shift from oil to other energy 
resources such as natural gas and renewables, and to move from Middle East towards other 
energy suppliers for their energy imports. 
 
On the supply side, the energy reserves in the eastern region of Russia are crucial to North-
east Asia. To date, most discussions of Russian energy have focused on its exports to Eu-
rope, but in the last five years, Russia’s interest in developing energy relations with its east-
ern neighbors and potential energy partners has grown. The main reason for this “Russia 
East” policy is to exploit the abundant natural gas and oil resources in the east of Russia 
such as Sakhalin Island, Yakutsk, and Irkutsk near Lake Baikal, which could supply North-
east Asia and even the whole Asia-Pacific market. 
 
Under these circumstances and in order to ensure energy security in the region, there have 
been many private sector efforts to connect these abundant energy resources with the de-
manding countries. The following are the major ongoing projects and plans in this region. 
Some of these initiatives are progressing more actively than others and bear a close review. 
 
16.7.2 Developing International Power Markets in East Asia 
The Greater Mekong sub region (Figure 16.21), Cambodia, Lao People’s Democratic Repub-
lic, Myanmar, Thailand, Vietnam, and the Yunnan Province of southern China—has signifi-
cant potential for cross-border power trade. The sub region is well endowed with low-cost 
hydro resources—the Mekong River Basin is the world’s twelfth largest river system—and 
China, Lao PDR, Thailand and Vietnam have large coal and natural gas reserves. The poten-
tial for trade stems from imbalances in costs and in supply and demand between countries 
in close proximity: the low cost hydro potential is in Lao PDR, Myanmar, and Yunnan Prov-
ince, but the main markets are Thailand and the more distant Malaysia-Singapore grid 
about 1,000 kilometers away. 
 
Recent studies comparing scenarios of electricity self-sufficiency in each country with a full 
trade scenario show that full trade could yield cost savings of at least US$10.4 billion in 
2001–20 and a reduction of airborne pollutants valued at US$160 million a year (these esti-
mates assume a significant slowing in power demand over the next few years in Thailand as 
a result of the current financial crisis.) The savings would arise from: 
● Lower operating costs due to economic power exchange, postponed and lower in-
vestments in generation due to least-cost development of regional energy resources, 
and reduced spinning reserve costs. 
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The President’s Critical Infrastructure Commission has outlined serious threats to the U.S. 
energy system from a number of sources—including hostile governments, terrorist groups, 
and disgruntled employees—as well as accidents. 
 
For some groups in developing economies, the sharp changes in fortune that accompany 
restructuring and global energy market integration can create a political backlash that 
threatens the security of neighbors who buy energy from them or import it through their 
territories. Intense discussions are now under way in Northeast Asia about cooperation in 
pipelines and high-voltage transmission lines extending from Russia into China. According 
to some estimates, Eastern Russia could supply half of Northeast Asia’s natural gas needs by 
2020. These projects offer great promise in meeting energy demand and in hands-on cooper-
ation among countries that have been historical competitors and enemies. The United States 
and countries in the region need to discuss the security implications of growing and asym-
metrical interdependence, however, at an early stage. Joint planning and scenario analysis 
involving government as well as private sector organizations will be needed to anticipate 
and mitigate risks. The United States could lend support for discussions involving public 
officials and private sector representatives from Japan and South Korea, but Russia and 
China also need to be involved. In addition to high-level discussions on rules of the road for 
cooperative energy development, there is a need for joint efforts among environmental ex-
perts to assess potential effects, among regulatory authorities to discuss harmonization of 
equipment and industrial standards, and among legal experts to clarify issues such as transit 
rights and reciprocal tax treatment. 
 
In developing Asia, where energy market integration is uneven, energy demand will grow 
sharply; because the infrastructure is inadequate and vulnerable, security-related problems 
are likely to grow. Attacks on energy infrastructure in friendly nations could lead to re-
quests for U.S. assistance—both official and private. U.S. cooperation in the APEC and other 
regional initiatives to promote common standards and shared infrastructure are, in this 
light, a good investment. Although U.S. support for APEC energy market liberalization in-
itiatives has been strong, energy security concerns have been treated with less urgency. U.S. 
industry and government could make this a higher priority and share expertise for assessing 
and mitigating risks. 
 
A second dimension of uneven globalization—Asia’s growing dependence on Middle East 
oil—also will present new challenges. The United States has made great investments in Per-
sian Gulf security and has gone to war to ensure the stability of the region and its oil pro-
duction. In the future, the narrow, shallow Straits of Malacca and the sea-lanes between the 
Middle East and Asia will be more congested with tankers and other ships carrying fuel and 
commodities. Today, 90 percent of Japan’s oil imports and most of South Korea and Tai-
wan’s oil imports flow through these waters. More than 200 vessels pass through the Malac-
ca, Sundra, and Lombok Straits and the South China Sea daily. In 1994, more than $1 trillion 
in international trade passed through these waters, which have seen an increase in serious 
accidents since the early 1990s. Piracy, kidnapping, and other acts of violence by non-state 
actors, such as leftwing rebels in the Philippines, are also on the rise. China has fortified 
small islets in the South China Sea with fort-like structures, and the number of incidents 
involving fishing and naval vessels from Southeast Asian countries has increased. 
 
deeply integrate economies in the region, investment resources, entrepreneurial skills, and 
experience in governance will be available to mitigate the downsides. At the same time, U.S. 
officials responsible for security as well as for economic policy need to anticipate prob-
lems—many of them unintended consequences of globalization—that they may be required 
to address. Focusing on Asia, where there is no overarching, institutionalized security 
framework and where energy market globalization offers perhaps the biggest un certainties 
as well as great promise, brings potential problems into sharper view. 
 
Among the countries of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) group, electricity de-
mand is projected to increase 60 percent by 2010, with China’s electricity demand likely in-
creasing by almost 6.4 percent annually. In India, the International Energy Agency (IEA) fore-
casts that electricity consumption will be more than double between 1995 and 2010. These 
forecasts (revised after the Asian economic downturn) imply major additions to generating 
capacity and to grids. Coal will likely continue to play the major role in electric power genera-
tion, but substantial increases in gas-fired generation are expected. Asia now has only limited 
intercountry electricity trade and pipeline systems. A number of countries, China in particular, 
have substantial energy resources located far from industrial and population centers. 
 
Most of developing Asia is part of the global energy system, but because of inadequate in-
vestment in infrastructure as well as weak political leadership, the connections are in some 
cases tenuous. Rapid population growth and pressures for economic restructuring and de-
regulation have already produced some wrenching changes. Twenty thousand miners ri-
oted in Northeast China in early 2000 after an announcement that a large mine had gone 
bankrupt, and workers were offered a one-time severance package equal to $68 per working 
year. The army was brought in to restore order, but the incident was not reported in the 
press for weeks. Industrial unrest is rising in China’s resources sector, where inefficient 
plants must be closed in line with government restructuring plans and ambitions to enter 
the World Trade Organization. 
 
Russia exemplifies another type of political complication associated with market integration. 
In Russia, the country with the world’s largest natural gas reserves, a good portion of which is 
located in the Far East, there are frequent blackouts. Gazprom cut gas supplies to RAO Unified 
Energy Systems (UES) recently in response to nonpayment. Gazprom is not investing enough 
to keep its gas flowing, and UES has warned that its old network of power stations and lines 
needs $75 billion in investment if Russia is to avoid blackouts. Europeans and Asians hoping 
to import more Russian gas are rightly concerned about supply security in light of Russia’s 
status as a non-signatory of the energy charter, which includes transit provisions. 
 
These examples illustrate the potential political fallout when energy market globalization 
occurs in developing and transitional economies that lack experience with market competi-
tion. As markets and infrastructure are connected across national borders, fuel substitution 
and economic benefits accrue. At the same time, new vulnerabilities are created. Energy 
infrastructure such as power grids can be the target of terrorists and opposition groups. 
These concerns are not unique to developing countries, of course.  
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International corporate linkages in Asian energy markets are most extensive in the upstream 
resource exploration and development areas. Japanese firms have for years been mining 
coal in Australia, developing natural gas resources in Indonesia, and purchasing oil from 
China. With greater openness come new possibilities. Tokyo Electric Power has stakes in 
new power-generating ventures in Malaysia and Vietnam. Enron has teamed up with ORIX 
Leasing to compete in Japan’s energy services and electric power markets. Marubeni, a Jap-
anese trading company, and Sithe Energies, an independent U.S. power producer, plan to 
buy power plants and market electricity in Japan. Gas and electric power are the focus of 
networks of growing international joint ventures that include firms from many Asian coun-
tries, as well as from the United States. 
 
These corporate linkages today extend further and deeper into the domestic economies and, 
in some cases, can stimulate market-oriented corporate restructuring and advanced technol-
ogy development. They can also lead to new security challenges. In 1996, Japan imported 
almost one-fifth of its natural gas from Indonesia, a country where violent independence 
movements have threatened central authority in some regions. Electric power, gas, and steel 
companies have long-term contracts for liquefied natural gas (LNG) imports from Indonesia 
that stretch more than a decade ahead in some cases. Two-fifths of Indonesia’s LNG exports 
come from Aceh, at the western end of Sumatra. Aceh is overwhelmingly Islamic; its rural 
people resent the wealth of the Javanese who run the industrial enclave. Disputes and vi-
olence have erupted. The potential fragmentation of energy- and resource-rich regions poses 
problems not only for central government but also for the importers whose investments 
become vulnerabilities. The United States, Japan, and others have an interest in developing 
multilateral approaches toward assistance that leverage the resources of the international 
community and address the basic grievances that have led to strife and tension. 
 
Advanced technology is diffusing through energy development, presenting another double-
edged sword from a security perspective. Japan, South Korea, Russia, China, Taiwan, India, 
and Pakistan have commercial nuclear power programs, and four of these states have tested 
and/or developed nuclear weapons. For Japan, nuclear power has been the central pillar of 
its energy policy—seen as Japan’s only hope for gaining a degree of autonomous control 
(through technology indigenization) and for meeting environmental commitments. Howev-
er, the serious criticality accident that took place recently at a fuel fabrication plant shook 
Japan’s energy policy leadership enough for the government to announce a comprehensive 
review. Japan’s ambitious plan to develop the complete fuel cycle has proved to be expen-
sive and technically difficult. Such problems aside, Asia has become the new center of gravi-
ty for the global nuclear industry, as additions to capacity in this region are projected to 
make up three-quarters or more of the world’s total over the next two decades. 
 
For safety, environmental, and nonproliferation reasons, advanced technology cooperation 
in energy among Asian nations is essential. Working with other nations around the world, 
the industrial operators and research institutions of Asia need to develop a stronger safety 
culture. In addition, governments will need to work to strengthen nonproliferation norms (a 
very difficult task in South Asia) and to build cooperation in material protection, account-
ing, and export controls. Weapons of mass destruction proliferation are clearly a major 
threat to the stability of a region where the security framework is weak. Two of the benefits 
Although some argue that territorial chokepoints such as these narrow water passageways are 
no longer security concerns in an age of globally integrated electronic markets that permit re-
routing of cargo and fuel switching, securing freedom of the sea-lanes may well be more of a 
security challenge in the future. Competing claims among six claimants to the Spratly Islands, 
differing interpretations of the United Nations Law of the Sea, and the inability of the Interna-
tional Maritime Organization to establish safety and environmental standards of sufficiently 
high quality all contribute to a sort of maritime anarchy. At the urging of the Philippines and 
other Southeast Asian states, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional 
Forum has agreed to take up the question of a code of conduct for the South China Sea; how-
ever, China opposes legally binding agreements and prefers to deal separately with each coun-
try. Other countries favor demilitarization and joint development, with the geographically 
closest claimant country taking stewardship over disputed areas. In this context, the potential 
for military conflict remains significant. By supporting efforts of regional states to address 
these issues, the United States can add momentum and expertise. 
 
In the future, accidents and acts of terrorism and piracy will be even more likely throughout 
the region. Some have called for a change in the transit passage law enshrined by the Law of 
the Sea separating commercial and military traffic. The objective would be increased regula-
tion of commercial vessels in the Straits of Malacca to ensure navigation safety without af-
fecting military or government vessels. Such a regime would involve not only the key states 
but also shipping concerns and user states such as Japan, China, and the United States. A 
working group has led another approach on maritime security cooperation of the Council 
for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific, a nonofficial organization that provides input to 
the ASEAN Regional Forum. The working group has developed guidelines for maritime 
cooperation and plans to examine the Law of the Sea to identify areas that need clarification 
in order to ensure maritime security in South Asia. These efforts suggest that addressing 
maritime security problems in Asia will be a challenging task, but arguably a good invest-
ment in preventive diplomacy. Cleaning up after a major oil spill and relief efforts to deal 
with terrorism or piracy could be much more costly after the fact. 
 
Another way to address vulnerabilities in energy transportation through the sea-lanes is to 
develop regional emergency response mechanisms. Japan, Australia, and New Zealand 
[WJL1] are the only Asian members of the IEA, although South Korea is following IEA activ-
ities closely, and programs for nonmember states such as China have recently expanded. 
Asia lacks a viable region-wide program of emergency response or oil stockpiles. Although 
the impulse is strong for many of the Asian countries to pursue old-style resource diploma-
cy to secure supplies of Middle East oil, a more effective approach would be to build coop-
erative emergency response measures. 
 
Market-oriented approaches can also contribute to solutions. Asian countries could permit 
cross-investment in downstream facilities so that refinery operations could be streamlined 
and efficiencies improved, encouraging Middle East countries to consider establishing sto-
rage facilities in the region. In addition, government involvement in emergency response 
and stockpile development is needed. American political support, technical expertise, and 
approvals to use international development assistance funding would help significantly in 
addressing energy security concerns in Asia and in bolstering the confidence and mutual 
trust required to sustain energy market liberalization policies over the long haul. 
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that stretch more than a decade ahead in some cases. Two-fifths of Indonesia’s LNG exports 
come from Aceh, at the western end of Sumatra. Aceh is overwhelmingly Islamic; its rural 
people resent the wealth of the Javanese who run the industrial enclave. Disputes and vi-
olence have erupted. The potential fragmentation of energy- and resource-rich regions poses 
problems not only for central government but also for the importers whose investments 
become vulnerabilities. The United States, Japan, and others have an interest in developing 
multilateral approaches toward assistance that leverage the resources of the international 
community and address the basic grievances that have led to strife and tension. 
 
Advanced technology is diffusing through energy development, presenting another double-
edged sword from a security perspective. Japan, South Korea, Russia, China, Taiwan, India, 
and Pakistan have commercial nuclear power programs, and four of these states have tested 
and/or developed nuclear weapons. For Japan, nuclear power has been the central pillar of 
its energy policy—seen as Japan’s only hope for gaining a degree of autonomous control 
(through technology indigenization) and for meeting environmental commitments. Howev-
er, the serious criticality accident that took place recently at a fuel fabrication plant shook 
Japan’s energy policy leadership enough for the government to announce a comprehensive 
review. Japan’s ambitious plan to develop the complete fuel cycle has proved to be expen-
sive and technically difficult. Such problems aside, Asia has become the new center of gravi-
ty for the global nuclear industry, as additions to capacity in this region are projected to 
make up three-quarters or more of the world’s total over the next two decades. 
 
For safety, environmental, and nonproliferation reasons, advanced technology cooperation 
in energy among Asian nations is essential. Working with other nations around the world, 
the industrial operators and research institutions of Asia need to develop a stronger safety 
culture. In addition, governments will need to work to strengthen nonproliferation norms (a 
very difficult task in South Asia) and to build cooperation in material protection, account-
ing, and export controls. Weapons of mass destruction proliferation are clearly a major 
threat to the stability of a region where the security framework is weak. Two of the benefits 
Although some argue that territorial chokepoints such as these narrow water passageways are 
no longer security concerns in an age of globally integrated electronic markets that permit re-
routing of cargo and fuel switching, securing freedom of the sea-lanes may well be more of a 
security challenge in the future. Competing claims among six claimants to the Spratly Islands, 
differing interpretations of the United Nations Law of the Sea, and the inability of the Interna-
tional Maritime Organization to establish safety and environmental standards of sufficiently 
high quality all contribute to a sort of maritime anarchy. At the urging of the Philippines and 
other Southeast Asian states, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional 
Forum has agreed to take up the question of a code of conduct for the South China Sea; how-
ever, China opposes legally binding agreements and prefers to deal separately with each coun-
try. Other countries favor demilitarization and joint development, with the geographically 
closest claimant country taking stewardship over disputed areas. In this context, the potential 
for military conflict remains significant. By supporting efforts of regional states to address 
these issues, the United States can add momentum and expertise. 
 
In the future, accidents and acts of terrorism and piracy will be even more likely throughout 
the region. Some have called for a change in the transit passage law enshrined by the Law of 
the Sea separating commercial and military traffic. The objective would be increased regula-
tion of commercial vessels in the Straits of Malacca to ensure navigation safety without af-
fecting military or government vessels. Such a regime would involve not only the key states 
but also shipping concerns and user states such as Japan, China, and the United States. A 
working group has led another approach on maritime security cooperation of the Council 
for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific, a nonofficial organization that provides input to 
the ASEAN Regional Forum. The working group has developed guidelines for maritime 
cooperation and plans to examine the Law of the Sea to identify areas that need clarification 
in order to ensure maritime security in South Asia. These efforts suggest that addressing 
maritime security problems in Asia will be a challenging task, but arguably a good invest-
ment in preventive diplomacy. Cleaning up after a major oil spill and relief efforts to deal 
with terrorism or piracy could be much more costly after the fact. 
 
Another way to address vulnerabilities in energy transportation through the sea-lanes is to 
develop regional emergency response mechanisms. Japan, Australia, and New Zealand 
[WJL1] are the only Asian members of the IEA, although South Korea is following IEA activ-
ities closely, and programs for nonmember states such as China have recently expanded. 
Asia lacks a viable region-wide program of emergency response or oil stockpiles. Although 
the impulse is strong for many of the Asian countries to pursue old-style resource diploma-
cy to secure supplies of Middle East oil, a more effective approach would be to build coop-
erative emergency response measures. 
 
Market-oriented approaches can also contribute to solutions. Asian countries could permit 
cross-investment in downstream facilities so that refinery operations could be streamlined 
and efficiencies improved, encouraging Middle East countries to consider establishing sto-
rage facilities in the region. In addition, government involvement in emergency response 
and stockpile development is needed. American political support, technical expertise, and 
approvals to use international development assistance funding would help significantly in 
addressing energy security concerns in Asia and in bolstering the confidence and mutual 
trust required to sustain energy market liberalization policies over the long haul. 
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of addressing the North Korea problem have been an expansion of security cooperation be-
tween Japan and South Korea and a broadening of dialogue involving China. 
 
Other forms of cooperation are also needed to make the most of new technologies that are 
coming on stream. They include micro turbines and fuel-efficient vehicles that offer promise 
not only for industrialized countries but also for many developing nations. Regulatory bar-
riers, as well as established business practices, may present obstacles to the application of 
new equipment and systems. Government leadership in eliminating regulatory obstacles 
and in supporting international partnerships could speed up penetration and assimilation of 
technologies—with environmental gains for all concerned. 
 
Thus, as energy market globalization proceeds in Asia, the likelihood that the United States 
will be forced to deal with threats that stem from unintended consequences will increase. 
Multiple actors will be involved, and solutions will in most cases need to be constructed—at 
least in the near term—in the absence of established frameworks and institutions. 
 
The potential security risks stem in large part from the unintended consequences of uneven 
globalization in a context of partial market liberalization. In the current transitional phase, 
critical choices are being made about financial investments, partnerships, technology devel-
opment, and fuels that will affect evolving and multidimensional interdependent relations 
among actors. Addressing energy security concerns, rather than dismissing them, is a re-
quirement for promoting market oriented policies. 
 
In this fluid context, the United States should take pre-emptive action, investing resources in 
preventive diplomacy and building security communities on specific issues in order to 
avoid the need for military force deployment down the road. Despite the uncertainties and 
inadequacies of multilateral approaches, there is really no alternative. The investments will 
be costly (not so much in terms of hardware, but in terms of time) and will challenge the 
skills of strategists trained to deal with more traditional security threats. Security specialists 
will need to work more closely with economic policymakers and the private sector, bridging 
the traditional separation between security and economic policy domains. 
 
Asia offers the most striking example of both the potential risks of neglecting these issues 
and the tremendous gains that can come from devising new ways to address the concrete 
problem of energy security. China and India, the emerging new energy giants, will need 
assistance in meeting energy requirements and addressing concerns about energy security—
if they are to contribute to, rather than detract from, Asian security. The United States will 
need to work proactively with them and with other countries in the region, forming new 
communities to deal with specific energy security concerns. In many cases, doing so will 
require focused dialogue not only with close allies and friends but also with other countries. 
Issues that require attention include disputes over energy-rich areas such as the South China 
Sea, the absence of an emergency response program in Asia to deal with oil supply interrup-
tions, and the need for cooperation in resource development and efficient and environmen-
tally sound energy use in the Russian Far East and China, as well as the potential for ex-
panded energy cooperation involving South and North Korea, if progress continues in 
building trust and reducing threats on the Korean Peninsula. 
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